



NEWSLETTER

No. 99-15

OCT 99



Task Force Eagle

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

for

Information Operations

Lessons Learned and Unit-Level TTPs

**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350**



FOREWORD

This is the second CALL newsletter that discusses the application of Army Information Operations (IO) doctrine in a peace operations environment. The first IO-focused newsletter, **CALL Newsletter No. 99-2, Task Force Eagle Information Operations: IO in a Peace Enforcement Environment**, provided an overview of how IO doctrine is modified for peace operations. This newsletter provides "how-to" specifics on how IO has been performed in Task Force Eagle at division level and below and includes unit-level tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned for tactical-level commanders and leaders. This newsletter is not doctrine, but rather an analysis of doctrine as it is being practiced in the field.

The intent of this newsletter is to provide commanders and their staffs a comprehensive document that shows how IO is being applied in peace operations. The TTPs and lessons learned contained in this newsletter provide a foundation for mission analysis, course-of-action (COA) development, and staff procedures for conducting IO in a military operations other than war environment. If your unit has identified lessons learned concerning IO, or IO TTPs that work, please share them with the rest of the Army by contacting CALL at DSN 552-2255 or 3035, FAX DSN 552-9564 or 9583, or commercial (913) 684-2255 or 3035. Our e-mail address is **call@leavenworth.army.mil**, and our WWW web page is **http://call.army.mil**. Be sure to include your phone number and complete address when contacting us.

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Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for Information Operations (IO)

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The intent of CALL publications is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publication are written by soldiers for soldiers. If you have, or your unit has, identified other relevant TTP for the U.S. Army, contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/2255 or DSN 552-3035/2255; FAX DSN 552-3035/2255; E-mail: <segliel@leavenworth.army.mil>. Articles must be submitted in either Word Perfect or Word format. Graphs, slides and clipart must be submitted separately from the document in either ppt, pcx or wpg format.




The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Chapter One Introduction


This is the second CALL Newsletter on information operations (IO) in support of peace operations. **CALL Newsletter 99-2, Task Force Eagle Information Operations: IO in a Peace Enforcement Environment**, January 1999, explains the elements of IO as they are applied to peace operations. This newsletter builds on 99-2 and provides lessons learned and TTPs identified by Task Force Eagle (TFE) in Operation JOINT FORGE (OJF). This chapter presents a review of current Army IO doctrine.

Army doctrine for Information Operations is still evolving and **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, the keystone IO manual, first published in August 1996, is undergoing review and change as Joint and Army IO doctrine is refined and updated. Information Operations (IO) in a military-operations-other-than-war (MOOTW¹) environment is still a developing area of doctrinal thought as Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) are still emerging and evolving in the field in the contingency operations, such as OJF in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The current Army IO doctrine manual emphasizes repeatedly that IO takes place across the operational continuum; however, as the published doctrine focuses primarily on combat operations, leaders faced with the challenge of employing IO in MOOTW find themselves having to interpret doctrine to apply it to a different set of tasks.²

Joint Doctrine for IO was recently published as **Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations**.³ *This joint publication builds upon, but does not supersede Joint Publication 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare*, 07 February 1996.⁴ Emerging Army IO doctrine will follow the construct of IO presented in the joint doctrine.

Field Manual 100-6, August 1996, defines Information Operations as "continuous military operations within the MIE (Military Information Environment) that enable, enhance and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations. IO include interacting with the global information environment and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities."⁵ This definition specifies the operating environment for IO, which is the MIE. The MIE is that military portion of the Global Information Environment which consists of "...information systems (INFOSYS) and organizations - friendly and adversary, military and non-military, that support, enable, or significantly influence a specific military operation."⁶

IO are comprised of the three interrelated components of *Operations, Relevant Information and Intelligence (RII)*, and *INFOSYS*. The Army uses three operations to conduct IO: 1) command and control warfare (C²W); 2) civil affairs (CA), and; 3) public affairs (PA). Grouping the five elements of C²W together with CA, and PA as specific information operations provides a framework to promote synergy and facilitates planning and execution. All military activities conducted as part of these operations are classified within the two disciplines of C²-Attack and C²-Protect. **Emerging Army IO doctrine uses the terms Offensive IO and Defensive IO, which are roughly synonymous with C²-Attack and C²-Protect, respectively.** C²-Attack is offensive IO which is intended to gain control of the adversary's C² function in terms of his information flow and his situational awareness. Effective C²-Attack allows friendly forces to either destroy, degrade, neutralize, influence, or exploit the enemy or adversary's C² functions. Successful C²-Protect operations ensure effective C² of friendly forces "by negating or turning to a friendly advantage the adversary's efforts to influence, degrade, or destroy friendly C² systems."⁷



Operations.

C²W Historically, the Army planned and executed the various elements of command and control warfare independently of one another.⁸ Successful C²W operations support the Army objective of achieving information dominance in any operational environment. Current IO doctrine combines the five elements of C²W into one integrated approach. Emerging Army IO doctrine de-emphasizes the term C²W and elevates the five elements of C²W as elements of IO along with Information Assurance, Physical Security, Counter Deception, Counter Propaganda, Counterintelligence, and Special Information Operations. Under current Army IO doctrine, the five elements of C²W are:


- **Operations security (OPSEC);**
- **Military deception;**
- **Electronic Warfare (EW);**
- **Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and;**
- **Physical Destruction.**

PA Public Affairs operations provide information about ongoing operations to the American soldier and the American public. PA operations enable the commander to effectively operate with the media and pull information from the media that is of value to the commander and his forces. PA facilitates media on the battlefield to tell the story of the operation to the public. PA keeps the command informed through command information program, which explains the purpose of the operation to soldiers and leaders and what their expected role is in support of it.

CA Civil Affairs operations secure local acceptance of U.S. forces by establishing the relationship between the military force, local civilian authorities, and interested international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs).⁹ Successful CA operations support information operations through their daily interface with key organizations and individuals operating in the MIE.

Relevant Information and Intelligence.


Relevant information is defined as - "Information drawn from the military information environment that significantly impacts, contributes to, or is related to the execution of the operational mission at hand....(RII) serves as the currency of IO"¹⁰ Intelligence is "the critical sub-element of relevant information that focuses primarily upon foreign environments and the adversary. In support of friendly operations, intelligence helps produce a common, current, and relevant picture of the battlespace that reduces uncertainty and shortens the commander's decisionmaking process."¹¹ This situational awareness, built from RII, shared throughout the force, is referred to as the Relevant Common Picture (RCP). "Relevant information drawn from the MIE supports the creation of situational awareness that contributes directly to effective C² during all stages of the decision and execution cycle."¹² The commander specifies information requirements in the form of CCIR and PIR that drive the information collection process and assets.




INFOSYS.

"INFOSYS include personnel, machines, manual or automated procedures, and systems that allow collection, processing, dissemination, and display of information."¹³ INFOSYS covers all of the links in the chain of actions and procedures that turn information into knowledge that will support the commander's decisionmaking process, maintain an accurate view of his battlespace, coordinate operations, and shape the MIE. INFOSYS disseminate the accurate view of the battlespace up and down the force giving leaders greater situational awareness (SA). INFOSYS provides the means to share SA throughout the friendly force in the form of the Relevant Common Picture (RCP). "Relevant information drawn from the MIE supports the creation of situational awareness that contributes directly to effective C² during all stages of the decision and execution cycle."¹⁴

INFOSYS include both military command, control, and communications systems and non-military communications systems and organizations that provide information and contribute to decisionmaking such as IOs, PVOs, NGOs and forums of civil and military decisionmakers. ☺



A Model of Current Army IO Doctrine Applied to Peace Operations



Endnotes, Chapter One

¹ The term "MOOTW," which is acceptable Joint terminology, is used throughout this newsletter as the Army's term of OOTW has been supplanted in some circles with support operations and stability operations. For the definition of MOOTW, see *The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02*, downloaded from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>.

² Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 August 1996, hereafter cited as **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**). The manual devotes only three pages to a discussion of the unique considerations for OOTW, a rather broad category of military operations, of which peace operations are merely a sub-set.

³ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 09 October 1998).

⁴ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, **Joint Publication 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare**, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 07 February 1996).

⁵ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 2-3.

⁶ Ibid., p. 1-4.

⁷ Ibid., p. 2-5.

⁸ Ibid., p. 3-0.

⁹ IOs are organizations with global or extra-regional influence – examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). NGOs are transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN. PVOs are typically non-profit organizations involved in humanitarian efforts. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Force Capabilities, Joint Publication 3-33*, (Preliminary Coordination Draft, Washington, DC: USGPO, 30 January 1998), p. IV-10.


¹⁰ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 4-0.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 4-3.

¹² Ibid. p. 4-1.

¹³ Ibid. p. 5-0.

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 4-1.



Chapter Two

The Division IO Staff


FM 100-6, *Information Operations*, addresses the formation of an IO cell, the structure of which is the prerogative of the commander. "It may be something as simple as the periodic use of an expanded targeting cell or a more formal approach establishing a standing cell with a specifically designated membership."¹

As Information Operations (IO) doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) have evolved and matured, the Division IO Staff in the American-led multinational division, known as Task Force Eagle (TFE) in the NATO-led peace enforcement operations in Bosnia, has matured through real-world experience. The term "IO Staff" refers to all staff officers who participate in IO planning and execution. "IO Cell" refers to the permanent standing cell focused on IO around which the larger IO Staff is organized. Several members of the IO Staff are full-time staff personnel for other staff cells, which requires the IO Cell to carefully coordinate their efforts and to manage time and people wisely. The Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) provides a forum by which the IO Cell routinizes the planning and coordination efforts of the larger IO Staff. IO have allowed the Stabilization Force (SFOR) to maintain situational dominance over the former warring factions (FWFs) and keep the peace.²

During Operation JOINT GUARD (OJG), the TFE division IO cell was formed around a five-man Field Support Team (FST) from the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA). As the Division IO Officer, the LIWA FST Chief chaired the meetings of the IOWG and reported to the Division Chief of Staff. The TFE weekly IOWG served the planning and wargaming and control functions of an IO Cell. This approach was in accordance with doctrine and appropriate for the situation. A small IO Cell operating through the weekly IOWG was appropriate to peace enforcement operations where the OPTEMPO is somewhat more predictable than in combat operations. Additionally IO doctrine for peace operations was still evolving forcing the division to use a "trial and error" approach to IO.³ Although doctrine gives the G-3 primary responsibility for IO, during OJG, the Chief of Staff assumed responsibility, because, in his analysis, the task spanned several staff functions in a significantly expanded and supplemented staff.⁴

As the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia have passed from Operation JOINT GUARD to Operation JOINT FORGE (OJF), the IO Cell evolved from a small cell formed around the LIWA FST and the periodic meetings of the IOWG, to a larger standing cell made up of elements from the LIWA FST and the Division Fire Support Element. During OJG, a team of five personnel from the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) ran the cell and was supplemented by a captain assigned IO as an additional duty from the Division Fire Support Element (FSE). At this writing, the section consists of a lieutenant colonel, the Division Deputy Fire Support Coordinator (DFSCOORD), his three AFSCOORDs from the Division FSE, one Reserve officer, and a three-man team from LIWA.

A LIWA FST provides expertise in IO planning, military deception, OPSEC, and tools for IO modeling, targeting, and synchronization.⁵ The National Ground Intelligence Center, in conjunction with LIWA, can support commands with specialized IO products.⁶ LIWA provides C²W and other IO support to Army organizations in the field through multi-disciplinary, task-organized Field Support Teams. These teams are rapidly deployable world-



wide in response to operational and exercise requirements.⁷ Task Force Eagle's first IO Cell was formed around such a team in November 1996, when the LIWA sent an IO FST to the Multinational Division North (MND-N) headquarters in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The team worked with General Meigs and his staff "to implement the first information campaign supporting a multinational peace operation since the publication of U.S. Army **Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations.**"⁸

The Commander of TFE and MND-N placed IO under the control of the DFSCoord, and used the Division FSE as its base structure. The IO Cell Chief had tasking authority through the G-3 to synchronize IO actions in accordance with the commander's vision. One of the lessons learned from the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia about coordinating IO within the staff was that "fully effective information activities are tied into operations – close integration with other operational staffs (in particular the (G2 and G)3 shop) allow information activities to be used effectively to prepare for, and better respond to, contingencies and refocus the effort when necessary."⁹

The evolution of the IO Cell into a larger, continuously operating standing cell headed by the DFSCoord provided the division positive results on the degree of integration in IO planning, and on the synchronization of IO execution. Having an appointed IO Cell Chief in the rank of lieutenant colonel dramatically improved the quality of inputs into the IOWG by making the various functional representatives "accountable" for the contributions, or lack thereof, from their respective functional areas. As the DFSCoord, the IO Cell Chief had the ear of the Division Commander. As a lieutenant colonel, he was on a peer level with the Division primary staff officers, most importantly, with the senior Public Affairs officer (PAO), the Director of the Coalition Press Information Center. The CPIC Director and IO Cell Chief formed a powerful team that resulted in tighter synchronization of IO throughout the division, and in more effective themes and messages.

Although the IO Cell Chief did not have command or controlling authority over the many IO elements, he provided an integrating and synchronizing oversight that conferred "unity of command" on behalf of the Division Commander. Several of the IO elements had independent lines of control, for example, the Division PSYOP Development Detachment was under the control of the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF). However, the IO Cell Chief drew together these lines of control like the risers of a parachute to ensure they were mutually reinforcing, non-contradictory, and focused on the division's operations. This "unity of command" provided more "unity of effort" and resulted in faster decisionmaking and direction for all IOWG participants. The IO Cell Chief's primary function is to ensure the coordination of the IO components of command and control warfare, civil affairs, and public affairs (C²W, CA, and PA, respectively). Accordingly, he must possess both technical expertise and extraordinary inter-personal and team-building skills.

The evolution of the standing IO Cell within the Division FSE occurred simultaneously with the gradual de-emphasis on lethal fires as the general situation and SFOR interactions vis-à-vis the Entity Armed Forces normalized. The Division Commander selected the DFSCoord not only because of the decreased emphasis on lethal fires, but also because IO's targeting methodology mirrors the lethal fires targeting methodology used by the Field Artillery.¹⁰ The IO Cell develops the IO Annex for every OPLAN/CONPLAN, and also develops themes, messages, and talking points on short notice for crisis events. Annex development for OPLANs and CONPLANs approximates the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

As Task Force Eagle personnel conducted peace-enforcement operations, they remained prepared to apply lethal combat power to enforce the peace if necessary. If conflict should erupt and flare, the IO Cell could expand into an IO Battle Staff. FM 100-6 states that in situations of open conflict, it may be more appropriate to stand up an Information Operations Battle Staff (IOBS) to integrate IO in the staff. "The (IO) battle staff would consist of all staff members with a functional responsibility within IO, such as signal, fire support, PA, CA, operations



security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOP), and military deception."¹¹ This would be extremely difficult for a "normal MTOE" division to accomplish without an already functioning IO cell. In conflict situations, the FSE's total focus would be on coordinating lethal and non-lethal fires support.

The IOWG also grew in size from OJG to OJF as TFE learned how to better synchronize the information activities of its maneuver and support elements. The IOWG in OJF consisted of the following representatives:

- **Division IO Cell Chief as Chairman of the IOWG**

- **Assistant Fire Support Coordinator (AFSCOORD)**

- **Deputy Division IO Officer (LIWA FST Chief)**

- **Public Affairs Officer (PAO)**

- **Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) Director (a senior PAO officer)**

- **Provost Marshal (PMO)**

- **SOCCE (representing the Joint Commission Observers (JCOs))**

- **Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)**

- **G-5 Civil Affairs**

- **G-2 augmented by representatives from the Analysis Control Element, Long-Term Analysis, and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT).**

- **G-3 Plans**

- **Allied Brigade Information Operations Officers¹²**

- **American Brigade Information Operations Officer**

- **Task Force Liaison Officers Joint Military Commission (JMC) representative**

- **Division PSYOP Development Detachment Commander**

- **Political Advisor (POLAD) (as needed)**

- **TF Engineer**

In peace operations, the "battle rhythm" is more predictable than in combat operations. During OJF, the IO Cell held Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) meetings twice a week. Meetings held on Wednesday morning included the brigade representatives, who were afforded the opportunity to formally address what they were working on in their brigade area and submit any requests for assistance. Saturday meetings excluded the brigade representatives. The IO cell also met on a daily basis with some of the key IO planners and executors (PSYOP, SJA, PMO, PAO) to discuss any issues that may need to be reviewed. For unplanned events, the IO cell would call an emergency IOWG, follow an abbreviated decisionmaking process to quickly produce themes, messages and talking points, which were then distributed to the Division Staff and Brigades. Since most of TFE's IO applied non-lethal compact power, "Influence Operations" were the predominate task of the IO staff.

Themes and Messages

Task Force Eagle uses themes and messages as a means to synchronize IO throughout the AOR. During Operation JOINT FORGE, Task Force Eagle used themes and messages as a primary tool in the IO campaign. They served as the medium through which the command ensures all elements in the task force promote mutually supporting objectives. Themes and messages are provided to commanders and subordinate units to use as they interface with the various elements in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs) during the conduct of routine operations. Additionally, they are integrated into civil affairs missions, disseminated through all components of the broadcast media, weaved into command information materials, dispersed by PSYOP teams, military police, and every other unit within the task force who interacts with the local populace.



Themes are broad statements supporting the SFOR mission and the General Framework Agreement on Peace (GFAP). They may represent essential components of the end state or final objective that the commander is attempting to attain. Examples of TFE themes include:

- **Peace is essential to economic recovery, international aid and prosperity.**
- **Civil, military, and political officials are accountable for their actions.**


Messages directly support the themes by providing specific actions (or non-actions in some cases) that are tied to the theme. They are often the yardstick used to measure the acceptance of themes. Messages are what the TF elements attempt to relay during contacts with local officials and the populace. Messages are not intended simply to be read, as if from a script. They can, and should, be tailored to suit the audience being addressed. Whether it be delivered actively or passively, the intent is to convey the meaning of the message as it supports the theme. Examples of messages that support the themes above include:

- **Acceptance of ethnic differences supports economic development and stability.**
- **You (referring to civil, military and political officials) are responsible for controlling your citizens, for public safety and for keeping the peace.**

Themes and messages are the framework of the IO campaign. In fact, it could be argued that progress in a peacekeeping mission, such as Operation JOINT FORGE, could be measured by determining the level of popular support for the themes and messages. In other words, general acceptance of themes and messages may well be the ultimate objective. If the population can be convinced to accept the themes and messages without the threat of force or coercion, success may have been achieved. If, on the other hand, the population does not adopt the themes and messages, or does so only to avoid retribution, the mission may be no closer to being complete than when it began.

Themes require approval from SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo. The reason is probably apparent. They are general in nature, apply to the entire theater, and are not localized. This is an important point. Every element of SFOR must, at all times, appear impartial. Therefore, all themes must apply to all factions. The methods of delivery (i.e., through messages) may require differing approaches based on the audience, but the themes do not vary. Of course, themes may be selectively emphasized to account for differing priorities in different locations. In other words, certain themes may need to be advanced in some areas and do not even need to be discussed in others. Themes can be suggested by virtually any element within the theater but, if approved at the TFE level, will be submitted to SFOR headquarters for final approval. Upon receipt of the approved themes, the IOWG will conduct an analysis of the themes and then produce a recommended list of messages to support them. The Commanding General, Task Force Eagle, is the final approval authority for the recommended themes and messages list within his AOR.

Themes and messages are disseminated down to the units through a variety of means. While they do not change often, periodic revisions occur as events unfold. Within Task Force Eagle, OPORDs (more often FRAGOs) are the primary means of disseminating approved themes and messages down to the brigades. Additionally, the IO Cell posts updated lists on the tactical local area network (TACLAN) which ensures the list is available to all subordinate units and staff sections that are TACLAN capable. The Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) produces a weekly update with special emphasis on appropriate messages. The CPIC will occasionally provide a special edition of its *Weekly Update for Commanders* when the situation dictates. For example, a special edition for



the Brcko Arbitration Decision was published prior to the anticipated release of the final decision on the outcome of the city. According to a member of the TFE IO staff, one of the tenets of IO is to ensure that the entire force "speaks with one voice." The intent is to ensure all elements of the command are synchronized. Themes and messages provide the commander with a tool for ensuring all the various elements within the command are indeed "speaking with one voice."

Lesson Learned: Development of themes and messages is an integral component of the Task Force Eagle Information Operations campaign. A method of ensuring that all elements within the task force are speaking the same message is critical to the unit's success. This is particularly important when operating as a joint and combined force. Approval authority for themes, while appropriately relegated to the SFOR staff, require rapid and thorough staffing to avoid missing targets of opportunity identified at the operator levels. It is not necessarily a top-down process. Subordinate elements that are routinely interfacing with local officials or the populace in general are valuable sources of information when developing themes.

Staff Planning Products

In addition to modifying the IOWG meeting schedule, the TFE IO Cell also changed its format. Initially, the IOWG reviewed every project and issue. Because there were so many projects, the IOWG didn't have much time to devote to any of them. To achieve greater focus on single problem sets, the IOWG covered the overall current status of current projects in about ten minutes, and then spent 45-60 minutes on the "Focus Topic" for the meeting. The IO cell published the topics six weeks out so all representatives could prepare for them. An example of a "Focus Topic" was the anxiously anticipated Brcko Arbitration Decision. By knowing the topic in advance, each member of the IOWG came to the meeting fully prepared to participate. Through lively discussion, all IOWG participants were able to form a clearer picture of the problem and make their unique contributions to a combined staff solution.

The primary planning tool's format was also changed to focus on specific problem sets in the close fight as identified by the G-2 and confirmed by the IO Cell Chief. Using "focus" matrices for each problem set, the IOWG went through by functional area to brief their functional perspectives on the problem set, and then to discuss as a group what the potential IO messages, products, problems and solutions might be. The focus sheets resembled "matrix orders" in that they provided a clear easy-reference report that showed what each element was contributing in each problem set. The focus sheets provided a uniform format for IOWG representatives to report their actions to the IO Cell, and facilitated their mission analysis and course-of-action development in identifying appropriate IO ways and means. The focus sheets also served as a tracking tool for monitoring the progress of the IO Staff in providing required information, reports, or products for each problem set. The focus sheets also served as a historical record of the IO effort executed for the problem set, and in this regard served to support future planning for similar scenarios in the manner of a staff "play book."


In adopting the focus sheets as the planning, tracking, and execution tool for IO, the IO Cell standardized planning for all problem sets. Using the focus sheets enabled the IO Cell to better track the development of the IO plan, and to ensure synchronization among the various IO operators. Emphasizing each functional staff area and unit encouraged the IOWG representatives to critically analyze how their unit or staff section could contribute to the IO effort in each problem set. Finally, the focus sheets provided the IO Cell Chief a better way to manage and track the IO efforts for each problem set, and facilitated briefing IO actions to the commander in an easier to understand format.

MISSION LOG: What is the problem set under consideration?
DATE LAST UPDATED:

ASSET	METHODS	DESCRIPTION	STATUS	FEEDBACK/ANALYSIS
DIV IO	Obtain IO plans from SFOR, guidance from Division Commander. Brief IO COAs to commander for approval. Task units for IO actions or reports.			
G2	Lead IO Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Respond to Intel RFIs. Brief IOWG on situation. Task-monitoring and collection assets.			
ACE	Provide detailed analysis of IO problem sets. Answer RFIs. Produce intel products for the IOWG.			
CIVIL AFFAIRS	Liaison to IOs, PVOs, and NGOs engaged in the AO. Provide info in form of HUMINT. Deliver IO messages to civil authorities and leaders in the community. Provide IO feedback and BDA.	What is it that this battlefield function or unit is supposed to accomplish? What IO ways and means are being applied, to what target, and for what effect? What IO tasks have been assigned? For what information requirements are they responsible?	What is the status of assigned work?	
PSYOP	1. Tactical Team face to face. 2. Loudspeaker OP. 3. Pre-Recorded Radio Shows. 4. Radio MIR (McGovern). 5. Quick-Print Products. 6. Request products from CJICTF.			Provide feedback on how successfully assigned tasks, messages, etc., were carried out. What new relevant information and intelligence (RII) was obtained in the process which contributes to a more refined Relevant Common Picture? Is any assistance required? Does the target need to be "hit" again?
JMC	1. Impromptu BILATs. 2. Dispatches. 3. Telephone Conferences. 4. LO Briefings. 5. Deliver messages to EAF.			
PAO/PIO	1. Media Messages for Cdrs. 2. Media Lines (a) Queries (b) Media Advisories & Press Preleases. 3. Weekly Press Conferences. 4. Media Events and MPAD coverage. 5. Media Analysis.			
PMO	1. Liaison to IPTF and Entity Police. 2. Determine Entity Police capabilities and limitations. 3. Determine Law and Order aspects of operations. 4. Deliver messages to entity police.			

MISSION LOG: DATE

ASSET	METHODS	DESCRIPTION	STATUS	FEEDBACK/ANALYSIS
SOCCE	Serves as a communications conduit between the joint Commissioned Observers and the Russian Brigade Liaison Coordination Element of G2 Info OP.			
U.S. Brigade	Commander's radio shows, meetings with Chiefs of police, Majors, interviews with the press, letters to key actors and influencers.			
MNF Coalition Bde	Commander's radio shows, meetings with Chiefs of Police, Majors, interviews with the press, letters to key actors and influencers.			
MNF coalition Bde	Commander's radio shows, meetings with Chiefs of Police, Majors, interviews with the press, letters to key actors and influencers.			
MNF Coalition Bde	Commander's radio shows, meetings with Chiefs of Police, Majors, interviews with the press, letters to key actors and influencers..			
ENGINEERS	Build and repair bridges/roads, demining. Interacting with locals as ambassadors of SFOR. Advice to IOs working infrastructure repair projects.			
SJA	Review products for legal issues. Link to the judicial element of power among FWF. Legal analysis of TOR and Peace Mandate.			
OSINT	Track media reporting of problem set issues. Provide analysis of such reports to build RII in support of IPB.			
G3 PLANS	Synchronize IO with Division Plans and operations. Ensure IO plans are correctly phased to support operations.			



The development of annexes for CONPLANs and FRAGOs for on-going operations followed the Military Decision-Making Process. The TFE IO Cell identified the linkages between the MDMP and the IO Campaign Planning Model developed by LIWA. Together with the focus worksheet for planning, the refined planning model helped the IO Cell to follow a clear methodology for developing concerted and synchronized staff products and IO annexes and FRAGOs (see Figure 1).





Figure 1. IO Planning overlaid on the Military Decision-Making Process.



Planning and Executing Division IO – From an Anticipated Problem Set.


The IO Cell and supporting IO Staff developed messages for the Commander in anticipation of potentially riotous demonstrations known to be planned by various factions in the two Bosnian entities, preventing the outbreak of violence. SFOR maintained rather good situational awareness (SA) on the intentions of political and social groups operating in the AO. In December, 1998, Task Force Eagle (TFE) knew that various groups from the two entities (Bosnian-Croat Federation, or BiH on the one hand, and the Bosnian Serb Republic, *Republika Serpska*, or RS on the other) were planning independent, but geographically proximate and chronologically simultaneous demonstrations and actions in the Brcko area on December 15, 1998. The arbitration of the fate of the city of Brcko was a significant area of contention between the two hostilities, and a potential *causis belli*. Additionally, the issue of resettlement of Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE), made Brcko a place of potential clashes as DPRES attempted to resettle in their old homes and neighborhoods.

The American Battalion Task Force operating out of Camp McGovern received Human Intelligence that local Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) planned to hold a rally and demonstration on December 15, 1998, in the Brcko suburb of Brka. Two other organizations had announced plans to hold a combined demonstration in Brcko to voice grievances against the municipality and entity (RS) governments. These were the Association of Disabled War Veterans and the Municipal Association of the Families of the Killed and Missing Persons. In addition, contentious "house-cleaning" visits from Bosniaks to their former homes in Brcko were scheduled for that day. And to top it all off, the civil defense siren that had been used on 28 August 1997 to assemble angry crowds of demonstrators against SFOR was to be tested that day.

The Analysis Control Element (ACE) of the Multinational Division North (MND-N) G-2 section analyzed these demonstrations as having the potential to grow into disturbances with the potential for violence and civil disobedience. The Commander wanted to pre-empt such an eventuality by rapidly disseminating messages to targeted audiences that would discourage violent demonstrations. The underlying theme to these messages was that the right to demonstrate is an inherent part of a free society, but that such a right is not a license to commit violence, and SFOR would not tolerate violent demonstrations. A supporting message encouraged several audiences to ignore agitators, from either in the town or from outlying areas, who might try to use such demonstrations to instigate violence to serve their own purposes.

Two weeks prior to the scheduled demonstrations, the Commander had approved themes and messages developed by the IO Cell and supporting IO Staff. These messages were flooded into the zone by the American Brigade, and reinforced with increased physical presence patrols in the area. Every IO medium available to the commander was used to disseminate these messages in the TF Sector. Liaison to the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and local entity police forces emphasized the messages and discussed the operational plans of the entity police to handle demonstrations. Press coverage of Exercise Joint Resolve which began on December 14, visibly raising SFOR presence and activity in the area, also served to highlight SFOR's readiness to deal with contingencies.

Messages disseminated in the IO FRAGO directed units in the division to "conduct information exchanges with regional and local or municipal authorities and the general public" to convey the following approved messages:



General Public

- The right to demonstrate peacefully is part of a democratic society, but that right to demonstrate is not an excuse for violence.
- Do not let known troublemakers or agitators destroy the peace process in BiH. These cowardly criminals have no respect for the citizens of BiH.
- SFOR actively seeks to prevent known agitators from inciting civil disobedience.


Entity Police Forces

- You are responsible for maintaining public safety and order.
- Beware of threats posed by paid instigators who will incite violence.
- Use your office to promote peace and stability. Don't let these known criminals destroy the peace process in BiH.

Entity Armed Forces. Don't let your soldiers get involved in acts of civil disobedience.

December 15, 1998, did not turn out to be a significant event as the demonstrations themselves were cancelled and the house cleaning proceeded without incident – the day ended in accordance with the commander's desired end state. This incident is a clear demonstration of how the development of Relevant Information and Intelligence on the situation with respect to non-military aspects of the operation enabled the peace operations force to plan preventative maneuver and information operations and actions to maintain the peace. IO planning benefited from *information superiority* which enabled the commander to maintain control over the situation and plan and prepare for contingencies. This incident provides an illustrative example of how RII contributes to *information superiority* which then lead to *situation dominance*.

Lesson Learned: *The approach taken by Task Force Eagle in developing a plan in response to a potential problem set of civil disturbances provided a preventative plan that discouraged civil disobedience and violence through the dissemination of IO messages synchronized with operations such as exercises and increased presence patrols. Synchronizing all information channels with a clear common set of messages ensured that all forces were speaking "with one voice," and in synch with the commander's intent.*



Planning and Executing IO – Commander’s Themes and Messages.

One of the key players in developing IO messages and themes in support of operations is Public Affairs (PA). With a background in projecting information to specified audiences, PA provides essential support to the IO Cell in helping to develop talking points for the commanders for the different projects and issues. **PA is a powerful conduit for truth-projection activities for newsworthy activities and provides support to IO in the form of issuing press releases, conducting press conferences, and participating in radio shows.** The CPIC coordinates with the IO cell to develop these messages, staffs them through the subject matter experts (POLAD, SJA) before getting the Commanding General’s approval. Once approved, the IO section disseminates the messages in the G3 FRAGOs and in the *Weekly Media Messages for Commanders* report. The intent is to have talking points available early for commanders and staff officers to use in encounters with the media and when talking to local leaders and citizens, and for use during the commander’s radio shows. Soldiers on patrol use the talking points to deliver the messages to the local citizens. Virtually anyone (engineers, JMC, PMO, JVB) who interacts with Bosnian citizens uses the talking points to deliver the IO message. The Commanding General’s approval ensures the entire force speaks with one voice.


The CPIC developed a Question and Answer (Q&A) format as a part of its weekly report. The CPIC director coordinated with the IO section and produced Q&As for hot topics the commanders’ use. They chose the topics based on conducting a thorough media analysis. The Task Force commanders relied on these products. These products also permitted the Division PSYOP Development Detachment Commander to hasten the PSYOP approval process, since he could show the PSYOP Task Force (POTF) that the proposed products were supporting a broader effort using the same messages, thus speeding product production, and tying PSYOP closer to division operations.

Duties of the Information Operations Working Group Members.

The IO Cell in Task Force Eagle has evolved over time, continually refining procedures as it "operationalizes" a new doctrine in peace enforcement operations. The IO Cell forms the nucleus of the Division’s IO staff which includes staff members of other permanent staff cells who come together on a periodic "on call" basis to address IO. The IOWG provides a format and forum for the IO cell to assemble the complete IO Staff for planning and coordination.

One of the purposes of the IOWG is to facilitate a discussion across the various disciplines to inform the group about how each particular function is affected by or affects the situation in both general terms and IO-specific terms. Functional representatives to the IOWG are responsible to contribute to a better understanding of the problems facing the group from their functional perspective. An important function of the IOWG is to refine the common picture and then develop, analyze, and compare solutions to problem sets.

The following roles and tasks were developed by the TFE IOWG and document concrete ways each representative can make meaningful contribution to mission analysis, course-of-action (COA) development and wargaming, and COA comparison.



1. **Division IO Cell.** The Division IO Cell is the hub of activity for all IO in the Division. The Division IO Cell representative may be the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) FST Chief, or another officer from the Fire Support Element (FSE) targeting cell.¹³ The Division IO Cell representative briefed an overall assessment of the IO Campaign, determined the problem sets, managed the worksheets, collected inputs and products from the various IOWG representatives, and produced the final products for the IO Cell from meetings of the IOWG for dissemination to its members. The Division IO Cell representative managed outstanding taskings to IOWG representatives for the IO Cell OIC.

2. **G-2.** The G-2, ACE, OSINT and SOCCE should all brief immediately following the IO Cell. Their information flows together and makes for a more logical briefing sequence. The purpose of the G-2 presentation is to provide a clear common picture of the threat situation on which all planning and analysis is based. The G-2 must give an organized prepared presentation, articulating the who, what, when, where, and why of the intelligence situation. Step 5 of the Information Campaign Planning Process,¹⁴ "Seek Predictive Intelligence About the Situation," is the responsibility of the G-2. The better the G-2's presentation, the more effective the IOWG will be in Step 6, "Help the G-2 Conduct IPB." Representatives from the **Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)** section and the **Analysis Control Element (ACE)** (both under the Division G-2) complemented the G-2's information in IOWG meetings held during SFOR 4 in Operation JOINT FORGE.

3. **Open Source Intelligence (OSINT).** The OSINT representative briefed focused open-source media analysis of events relevant to problems facing the IOWG and reported in the entity and regional media. Such information helps refine the common intelligence picture.

4. **Analysis Control Element (ACE).** The ACE representative should be intimately familiar with the various data bases being managed in the ACE that could provide support to problem sets. The ACE representative is responsible for conducting detailed analysis of these sources in support of IO planning and wargaming.

5. **Special Operations Coordination and Control Element (SOCCE).** The Joint Commission Observers (JCOs) were closer to the ground than anyone in SFOR. Their conduit to the IOWG was the representative from the SOCCE who provides any additional information in the form of HUMINT to further refine the common picture of the problem set. The JCOs had routine meetings with officials and "the man on the street" every day. The HUMINT input provided by the SOCCE representative helped clarify the image presented by the G-2. For this reason, the SOCCE representative occasionally briefed in tandem with the G-2. The one function the JCOs provided better than anyone else is Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) or feedback, on the effectiveness of IO products. The SOCCE representative was responsible then, for providing this feedback on the effectiveness of IO products.




6. **Provost Marshal (PMO).** The PMO was the division's primary link to the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia. The PMO provided input to the IOWG on IPTF perceptions of the political alignment, degree of cooperation, capabilities and limitations, and most probable courses of action of the entity police forces.¹⁵ During Operation JOINT GUARD, the PMO-IPTF relationship solved several informational requirements both before and during operations intended to separate FWF non-combatants.¹⁶ One of the significant sources of power among the FWFs was the police. In peace operations, inter-actions with the local police represent a source of information, and a platform to send IO messages to decisionmakers. The PMO representative to the IOWG briefed what the challenges were facing local police forces in handling the various threat eventualities in each problem set, and the probable actions/challenges/dangers to IPTF members as well. The PMO presented the entity police perspective on problem sets and was the local police role-player in IO wargaming.

7. **Engineer.** During the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia, the engineers stood out as an element of SFOR that actually had an impact on the day-to-day lives of the local populace through their road improvement and bridge projects in the AOR. Although the engineer units may have viewed these tasks as more of a training opportunity, their projects had a spin-off effect on the credibility of SFOR on other matters. As the IOWG reviewed problem sets, the Engineer representative reported what engineering projects had recently been completed, were planned, contemplated, or possible for each area under consideration. For example, during wargaming on the seating of the Municipal Assembly in Sebreinica, the Engineer needed to answer: "Is there a project either being contemplated or in the realm of possibility in the Sebreinica area that could be undertaken after the assembly is seated? Are there any recently completed projects about which SFOR can advertise in contentious areas to improve its humanitarian image?" These projects constituted a "lever" on the perceptions of the local populace. Such projects may not have been of immediate value in any particular problem set, but knowing what projects have been recently completed, were underway, were being contemplated, or were in the realm of the possible, provided a clearer picture on how SFOR influenced events and perceptions in the areas considered.

8. **Civil Affairs (CA).** CA serve as the link between the Peace Operations Force and the Humanitarian International Organizations (IOs), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operating in the AO. When a particular problem set is under discussion, everyone in the IOWG should be apprised of the general civil and humanitarian assistance situation in the area. The CA representative was responsible to brief what the IOs, NGOs, and PVOs were doing in the areas under consideration to see if their actions support, detract from, or are neutral to division IO. In general, the CA representative is best able to describe how effectively the economic instrument of national power was being applied through projects sponsored by the U.S. Agency for Internal Development (USAID) and similar efforts. For the other members of the IOWG to evaluate the feasibility and efficacy of IO options, they needed to know the capabilities and plans for each potential level (economic, military, political) for each problem set.

Both IO and CA doctrines spell out clearly an information-gathering role that supports intelligence. "CA provide a critical means for the commander to collect CCIR through their liaison and interaction with local civil authorities and IOs, NGOs, and PVOs in the AO."¹⁷ CA information-gathering activities in peace operations encompass the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, and economic issues within the AO to provide the commander his information requirements in these areas, primarily in the form of human intelligence (HUMINT).¹⁸ The CA representative was tasked to brief information gleaned from meetings with local authorities, such as the Chief of a city Fire Department or Department of Public Safety. The CA representative was also tasked to brief the IO messages successfully disseminated to these officials.



9. **Public Affairs (PA).** In TFE, the PA component consisted of both the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) and the Division Public Affairs Officer. The PA staff officer presents draft command messages, expected media questions with researched answers, and conducts media analysis. Weekly, the Senior PA officer published the *Commander's Weekly Themes and Messages* to all the base camps. These themes and messages supported IO by ensuring that every contact with target audiences from any element of the peace operations force was an opportunity to reinforce the IO campaign. By conducting media analysis, the PA identified what topics and issues were being reported in the local media and provided the IOWG a sense of where the public's attention was focused. This allowed the IOWG to see what issues were the focus of attention in the local population. In discussing specific problem sets, the PA representative explained whether or not PA can support C²-Attack operations in the form of either active measures, such as press conferences, press releases, articles, or specific talking points, or passive C²-Protect media guidance to commanders. PA prepared crisis reporting plans for high-profile incidents such as riots or arrests of war criminals. PA reviewed IO products from a "professional media" perspective to suggest improvements.

10. **Joint Military Commission (JMC).** The Joint Military Commission (JMC) liaison offices established between SFOR and the Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) are at once: a) a conduit of information for COMSFOR and his multinational division commanders to the military leadership of the EAFs; b) a direct source of RII from EAF command and control echelons, and; c) a venue to conduct IO aimed at influencing this important group of significant actors. In MND-N, the JMC process represented a "low-tech" INFOSYS which enabled TFE to communicate to the FWF military leadership clearly. The JMCs gathered and maintained information on the preferences, positions, and understandings of the parties regarding the peace agreement; in fact, these were the JMC's CCIR.¹⁹ The JMC representative presents the EAF perspective on problem sets and is the EAF role-player for IO Wargaming.

11. **Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).** In support of IO planning, the SJA's function is primarily a safeguard to prevent action on the part of SFOR not in accordance with either the GFAP, U.S. laws, or host-nation (HN) laws in regards to its IO actions. The SJA is also the source of information on legal issues affecting operations. The SJA is the SME on the particulars of the GFAP and the responsibilities of the Entity civil and police and EAF leadership from a legal, that is to say GFAP, perspective. The SJA is the SME for local laws as well. Joint Doctrine for MOOTW tasks the SJA to "provide guidance on unique HN domestic legal practices and customs."²⁰ In peace operations, the SJA is the link to the legal elements of power among the FWFs. During Operation JOINT FORGE, the Division SJA IOWG representative had access to the INFOSYS represented in the forums of HN and IO legal authorities. From these perspectives then, the SJA representative to the IOWG provided input on the legal elements of power operating in the AOR.

12. **Political Advisor (POLAD).** The POLAD was a State Department-appointed civilian who served on the special staff of the Commander, Task Force Eagle (COMEAGLE). The TFE POLAD accomplished some of the same tasks as the JMC, only in political or diplomatic channels. The POLAD interfaced with significant actors outside the military environment, but acting inside the MIE, and by doing so was both a source of RII and a venue for IO. The TFE POLAD's meetings with leaders of social, political, and religious groups, as well as civil leadership, enabled COMEAGLE to influence these important decisionmakers, whose actions at times intruded into the MIE.²¹ During Operation JOINT GUARD, for example, the POLAD secured COMEAGLE's CCIR from political groups in advance of potentially disruptive, violent, and dangerous demonstrations and protests.²²




13. **Coalition Unit Liaison Officers.** The Multinational Division North (MND-N) was comprised of four ground maneuver brigades: one American, one Turkish, one Russian, and one comprised of units from the Nordic countries and Poland (Nord-Pol Bde). The coalition unit representatives to the IOWG were the personal representative of their Brigade Commander, and were responsible for briefing the commander's concerns and requirements for IO. Prior to the meeting, they consulted with their commanders to obtain these points. These liaison officers (LOs) provided access to national assets supporting their information-based military disciplines, such as PA, PSYOP, CA.²³ In addition, these LOs can identify opportunities where their parent units can leverage their ethnic and religious affiliations with the local populace in support of IO objectives. The unit LOs briefed any relevant information and intelligence (RII) gained through social patrols in their sectors, and through commander meetings with local civil and police officials. The LOs provide feedback on the effectiveness of IO themes, messages, and products in their AOR, to include commander's radio shows. The LOs presented the challenges they faced in their sectors to which IO might be applied.

14. **Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Cell.**²⁴ The PSYOP representative to the IOWG briefed the themes, messages, and products approved by the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF). The PSYOP products produced by SFOR were distributed by the division's Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) in the American Brigade sector and by "social patrols" in the coalition brigades in their sectors. The PSYOP representative briefed the division's Radio and Print PSYOP products and programs. The PSYOP representative seeks out the feedback from other members of the IOWG to refine products and develop new ones.

15. **American Maneuver Unit Representative.** The American Brigade representative to the IOWG was that maneuver commander's representative, and was responsible for briefing the commander's concerns and requirements for IO. Prior to the meeting, he consulted with the commander to obtain these points. He briefed the commander's radio shows and the results from the commander's meetings with local civil and police authorities in building RII. The unit representative briefed the challenges in his sector to which IO may be applied. He also briefed any feedback on the effectiveness of IO themes, messages and products in his AOR.

16. **Division G-3 Plans.** The G-3 Plans representative to the IOWG briefed changes to standing CONPLANS, and FRAGOs for the division. He also proposed ways in which IO may support achieving the desired end-state for all division operations. He confirmed details of division plans and resolved questions on correctly phasing IO with the division orders and plans.

The IOWG is the means to 1) identify target pressure points; 2) identify objectives for each target; 3) prepare IO input for a synchronized IO plan. Through lively discussion, all IOWG participants were able to form a clearer picture of the nature of the problem and to perhaps see where their battlefield function might make a contribution. By understanding their roles and tasks, IOWG members were able to come to meetings fully prepared to discuss "their lane." One important task common to all IOWG representatives was to carry back to their staff cells and units a common image and understanding of how IO fits in each problem set. This was only possible when each representative "educated" one another on the aspects of the situation as viewed through the prism of their battlefield function -- or, in other words, when they "sold their function to the group." When each representative contributed something new to the problem, all representatives left the meeting with a clearer, more refined common picture which they could bring back to their staff cell or unit. By ensuring that each representative came prepared to contribute, the IOWG accomplished its purpose of creating synchronization among the various functions.



The guidance provided in FM 100-6 on the formation of an IO Cell was sufficiently flexible to allow the division to create a cell in accordance with the situation and its capabilities. The most significant effect of putting the IO Cell under the direction of a lieutenant colonel was to make IOWG representatives more accountable for their contributions to the IO effort. The gradual evolution of the IO Staff from a small cell under the Chief of Staff and periodic meetings of the IOWG to a standing cell in the FSE under the control of the Division G-3 was largely situation-specific and may or may not be the case for future operations. Divisions should be prepared to establish an IO Cell along the lines developed by the TFE in MND-N at the outset of any MOOTW operation. This will require a lieutenant colonel, working either within Operations, or, perhaps, as an independent cell reporting to the Chief of Staff, to organize and lead the IO Cell before deployment, as the FSE will be engaged in ensuring that lethal fires are readily available to the commander during initial operations.


Until OPMS XXI produces qualified Functional Area 30 (IO) officers to head the Division IO Cell, these personnel will have to come "out of hide." They will also require training to be proficient when the operation begins. The IO Cell Chief must understand the fundamentals of each of the elements of C²W, PA, and CA. As IO doctrine for MOOTW (and specifically for peace operations) continues to develop, TTPs for planning and executing IO will continue to improve. However, the deploying contingency force may not have the luxury of being able to undergo a "trial and error approach" to IO planning and execution and should stand up, train and prepare a standing IO Cell before deployment.

Roles of Special Staff Officers in IO – the SJA in IO.

During MND-N operations with SFOR 4 comprising Task Force Eagle, the roles of the representatives to the IOWG were refined to greater detail than even doctrine and LIWA training manuals provided. In particular, the contributions of the SJA to IO were vividly demonstrated during specific IO. In TFE, the SJA was the link to the legal elements of power among the FWFs. The Division SJA IOWG representative had access to the INFOSYS represented in the forums of HN and IOs legal authorities. The SJA IOWG Representative was a standing member of a legal forum consisting of SFOR, OHR, and the entity judiciaries. The SJA IOWG Representative could also tap into another forum, the committee for judicial assistance established by the OHR to oversee issues of jurisdictional authority.

The SJA Representative to the IOWG accessed information about the *municipal governments*, which were often a component of the problem sets that required SFOR's attention. An example of such a problem set is the seating of the municipal assemblies elected during the 1997 multi-ethnic elections which proved to be difficult in several municipalities. The SJA Representative also sought information on the judiciary operating in these areas, as they comprised an important element of power among the two entities. The SJA focused on the controversial issues that had the potential to erupt into demonstrations, such as housing laws, criminal law, and privatization. From these many perspectives then, the SJA representative to the IOWG was able to provide input on the legal elements of power operating in the AOR.

In support of IO planning, the SJA's function is primarily a safeguard to prevent action on the part of SFOR not in accordance with either the GFAP, U.S. laws, or HN laws in regards to its IO actions. The SJA is also the source of information on legal issues affecting operations. The SJA is the SME on the particulars of the GFAP and the responsibilities of the Entity civil, police and EAF leadership from a legal, that is to say GFAP, perspective. The SJA is the SME for local laws as well. Joint Doctrine for MOOTW tasks the SJA to "provide guidance on unique HN domestic legal practices and customs."²⁵ The IO campaign, developed to support the weapons and



munitions hand-over program during Operation JOINT FORGE, for example, was postponed until HN law was properly amended to create the conditions necessary for risk-free civilian participation in the program without fear of prosecution from local authorities. Before SFOR could promise, in its IO messages, amnesty to those participating in the hand-over program, it had to be sure that the HN laws would support that promise.


Any society needs the rule of law to function. A functioning judicial system provides the populace a non-violent means to address its grievances and adjudicate disputes. In peace operations, the judiciary element of government may not be functioning at the cessation of hostilities and will require time to recover its position in the affairs of society. In the NATO-led peace enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the judicial system of the entities and the legal systems in the two entities, the Bosnian-Croat Federation (BiH), and the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska, or RS) were rebuilt independently of one another. Each entity composed its own criminal code. Where new legal codes were wanting, the laws of the Former Yugoslavia were employed to fill the gap. This resulted in essentially three separate bodies of law, which were incomplete and potentially incompatible.

The SJA representative to the Information Operations Working Group performs many tasks in support of synchronized IO:

- **Liaison with legal and judicial forums dealing with the entity judicial systems and international organizations supervising HN legal and judicial institutions.**
- **Analysis of the Terms of Reference (TOR) associated with the peace agreement that govern the powers, roles, missions, and tasks of the peace operations force.**
- **Analysis of U.S. law (such as U.S. Title 10) which constrain the activities of military forces in peace operations, and their impact on IO.**
- **Analysis of HN laws at the local, regional, and national levels as may they affect both operations and IO themes and messages.**
- **Analysis of International Law governing relations between countries and the conduct of trans-national justice, such as the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the trial of persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs) as they affect IO.**
- **Analysis of legal issues when dealing with IOs, NGOs, and PVOs who may have their own information campaign.**

The SJA Supports C²-Attack IO.

On 07 January 1999, Ante Jelavic, the Bosnian Croat member of the Bosnian tri-lateral presidency appointed Zeljko Siljeg as the vice commander of the Federation Army and promoted seven other generals without conferring with his fellow presidents or SFOR. This action was in violation of the Commander SFOR (COMSFOR) Instructions to the Parties (ITP) which required that SFOR be notified of all promotions and appointments of military officers to ensure that the military remained a professional and apolitical institution. The Division Staff Judge Advocate provided a legal analysis of an SFOR-directed weapons seizure operation in response to treaty non-compliance, which provided clearly articulated arguments which were readily usable as IO messages through several dissemination channels. These channels included public affairs, psychological operations, and commander's radio shows, unit bi-lateral meetings with their military counterparts in the military forces of the FWFs, and meetings with civil leaders and police authorities.




On 9 January 1999, units in MND-N seized tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, radio and communications equipment from Weapons Storage Sites (WSS) and units associated with the officers promoted.²⁶ SFOR statements to the press echoed the demands given to Mr. Jelavic that SFOR Headquarters expected "their immediate suspensions and submission (of the promotion requests) for approval."²⁷ When Mr. Jelavic failed to respond to the ultimatum, SFOR began destroying the seized military equipment on 10 January. Inflammatory condemnations of the SFOR actions appeared in the local media immediately after the seizures and continued to follow and condemn the actions of SFOR. The daily Bosnian newspaper, *Slobodna BiH*, published a front-page photo showing SFOR soldiers cutting the tube of an HVO (Bosnian Croat Armed Forces) T54/55 tank seized from the HVO WSS in Livno.²⁸ Stories in the *Vecernji List*, a Bosnian Croat newspaper, compared the situation to 1945 when the British Army disarmed Croats who had been a *Reichs-protectorate* under Nazi Germany.²⁹ The Livno branch of the HVIDRA (Croatian Disabled Veterans of Homeland War Organization), for example, issued a statement which said SFOR was destroying weapons and other military equipment "we paid for...with our lives; the weapons that we have shed blood for."³⁰ Taken together, these inflammatory statements constituted anti-SFOR propaganda which had the potential to ignite conflict and fuel agitators.

The Division Staff Judge Advocate representative to the IOWG conducted an analysis of the situation and the new mission in relation to the Terms of Reference (TOR) governing the roles, responsibilities, and authority of the peace operations force. In peace operations, a mandate normally sets forth an objective and is a resolution approved by a competent authorizing entity such as the UN Security Council, or a regional body acting on its behalf.³¹ The peace accord or agreement is followed by agreed-to TOR which spell out the operational details of the peace operations force.

To ensure that the local people correctly understood the issues involved, Mr. Jelavic's violations of the Dayton Peace Accord and the ITP, the authority of SFOR to conduct such operations, and the intent of the seizures, MND-N needed to disseminate IO messages to prevent and counter propaganda and misinformation. The legal analysis conducted by the Division SJA provided the most powerful arguments and messages for the various target audiences. These legal arguments were subsequently crafted into targeted messages for several audiences, which were immediately distributed to all Brigade and Battalion Task Force commanders via IO FRAGOs and subsequently reinforced in the CPIC *Weekly Media Messages for Commanders*.³² The IO FRAGO and weekly CPIC report provided commanders two themes and 12 messages for dissemination through unit radio shows, bilateral commissions with the Entity Armed Forces (EAF), meetings with local civilian and police authorities, and other forums. The arguments presented in the SJA's legal analysis were almost directly quoted in a PSYOP handbill product targeted at the local populace.

The themes and their supporting messages disseminated in the IO FRAGO and weekly CPIC report were based on the SJA's analysis and the general responsibilities of SFOR in enforcing the GFAP.



Theme 1: SFOR will respond equally to situations regardless of the affiliation of the individuals or groups involved.

Messages:

- ☛ SFOR has the legal right to approve and disapprove promotions of EAF general officers to ensure that they are professional, politically neutral, and supportive of the peace process under Article 1 of the GFAP.
- ☛ The GFAP gives SFOR the authority to act, by any means necessary, to ensure compliance.
- ☛ Unauthorized military activity of any kind is strictly prohibited.
- ☛ SFOR has the means and resolve to enforce the GFAP.


Theme 2: Civilian and military leaders are accountable for their actions.

Messages:

- ☛ All entities have signed and accepted the GFAP.
- ☛ Those who violate the implementation measures are a danger to all persons working toward peace.
- ☛ Elected officials are responsible to the total populace.
- ☛ SFOR has the authority to require discipline, political neutrality, professionalism, and allegiance to the rule of law from EAF general officers.
- ☛ Military leaders are responsible for their units' good order and discipline.
- ☛ Ensure your subordinates perform their duties professionally.
- ☛ Set the example for the political leadership to follow so that others can follow your example of professionalism.
- ☛ These actions are taken as a direct result of the flagrant violation of COMSFOR's directive denying permission to make general officer promotions and moves.

The Division PSYOP Development Detachment (DPDD) developed a handbill for dissemination that borrowed heavily from the SJA's analysis and arguments. This handbill was produced using division-level production assets (Risograph) and the request for approval was transmitted to the CJICTF at Headquarters SFOR in Sarajevo. The product approval worksheet noted that the messages contained in the requested handbill were already being disseminated through PA and other IO channels in the division.

Lesson Learned: *The Staff Judge Advocate is an essential member of the IO Staff in MOOTW, where diplomatic and legal considerations predominate decisions on the use of military force from tactical through strategic levels. "Essential considerations for developing a campaign plan in peace operations include understanding the mandate and TOR."³³ In this case, the SJA was the Subject Matter Expert in identifying the appropriate IO messages to promote acquiescence from the local populace to accept the actions of the peace operations force and to target key decisionmakers to alter their course.*



Training the IO Staff.


Given that the IO cell is not a standing organization in most U.S. Army divisions, it can be assumed that little or no training is occurring on a routine basis that would prepare the cell to begin operating when required. Further, every scenario will be different. IO requirements for peacekeeping operations in a mature theater, such as Bosnia, may vary significantly from those in operations conducted in Somalia or Haiti. Moreover, combat operations, such as DESERT STORM, require a significantly different approach to information operations. The issue then is how to prepare the IO Staff to function as a key staff section, particularly in a scenario such as OJF when information operations assumes a prominent role in the division's mission. Clearly, standing up an IO cell is not an easy task. It takes time to train the individual members of the staff, and time to assimilate the staff into the division's planning cycle. Additionally, because the doctrine supporting information operations is still emerging, few widely published tactics, techniques and procedures exist to assist leaders in training the IO staff.

First, it is essential that the IO Staff develop a staff METL that identifies what the cell must be capable of executing in support of the Division METL -- *this will not be a simple task*. To address contingencies other than Bosnia, the IO METL must be broad enough to encompass the role of information operations across the spectrum of Army Operations. Without an IO-specific METL, however, the newly assembled staff may not have sufficient direction to focus their limited training time. Upon approval from the Chief of Staff, the IO Staff staff METL must further be integrated into the Division staff METL. An approved IO staff METL will provide the necessary training focus when an IO cell is assembled and will prove extremely useful in identifying minimum standards of proficiency.

Second, an IO SOP is essential. Upon activation of the IO Staff, it should be assumed that there will be insufficient time to develop appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures. The more likely scenario is that there won't be enough time to train the staff to proficiency. An existing SOP that identifies specific TTPs will prove extremely useful to the IO Staff. During OJF, the IO Staff instituted and refined the procedures for the IOWG improving on the existing SOP and providing the foundation for further refinement. Additionally, they developed a number of useful tools to assist them in synchronizing the IO campaign such as the **IO Events Matrix**. The method of developing and disseminating themes and messages as well as reporting procedures are all important components of the IO SOP. Again, as in the case of the METL, the SOP must be flexible enough to cover the role of the IO Staff in a wide variety of operations.

Third, every opportunity should be afforded for members of the IO Staff to receive the LIWA IO training (and in the case of a staff deploying to Bosnia, attend the theater-specific IO practical exercise). For a recent deploying division's train-up, a Mobile Training Team from the LIWA was dispatched to train the division IO cell and selected members of the division staff. This naturally has to be deconflicted with other pressing requirements, such as the Mission Rehearsal Exercise and other pre-deployment requirements, but should be integrated into the training plan. Not only is it important for the IO Staff to receive this training, other key members of the division staff, such as the G2, G3, G5, and the PAO, as well as the CofS, and the ADC should also attend this training if possible.

Fourth, the IO Staff members must be intimately familiar with all key components of the information operations campaign. It is imperative that they understand the missions, organizations, capabilities and limitations of all potential contributors to the IO campaign. At a minimum, the IO Staff should receive training on the following:




- Civil Affairs
- Public Affairs
- PSYOP
- G2 (Open-Source Intelligence and Analysis Control Element)
- LIWA FST
- Special Operations Coordination and Control Element (SOCCE)
- Military Police
- Staff Judge Advocate
- Engineers
- Joint Military Commission (as appropriate)


Fifth, these elements (to include the planners and the operators) that execute the missions within the IO campaign should be trained on IO, the IO Staff METL and the staff SOP. The idea is to ensure that all these components act in a coordinated manner. To achieve this synchronization, each element must understand how all the other players fit in the picture. A by-product of this will be an awareness of RII that, although perhaps not perceived as important to the individual who is observing it, may be of tremendous value to one of the other components.

Finally, the IO Staff must be thoroughly familiar with the existing doctrine and current literature addressing IO. Units forming an IO staff should request articles and observations from the CALL data base and training products and SOPs from the LIWA to reference as they train to conduct IO.

Lesson Learned: *The Information Operations Staff should be fully trained to execute its staff METL prior to execution of the Transfer of Authority. Some suggestions for improving the readiness of the IO Staff include:*

- ☛ Determining the IO staff METL.
- ☛ Developing an IO SOP.
- ☛ Requesting a Mobile Training Team or exportable training package from LIWA; ensuring maximum participation.
- ☛ Training the IO staff on missions, capabilities, and limitations of IO assets.
- ☛ Training all elements of the IO campaign.
- ☛ Utilizing existing doctrine, previous unit AARs and current literature (including the CALL data base, Initial Impression Reports and *News from the Front!*) to fully integrate emerging TTP and lessons learned.☺





End Notes, Chapter Two:

¹ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 Aug 1996, hereafter cited as **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**), p. D-0.

² The term "former warring faction (FWF)" is applicable to all peace operations involving former belligerents. In the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia, the term FWF refers to the three former warring factions of the Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnian Serbs. The term "entity armed forces (EAF)" refers to the military forces of the two entities created by the Dayton Peace Accord, namely, the Bosnian-Croat Federation (BiH), and the Bosnian Serb Republic (*Republika Srpska*).

³ LTC Stephen W. Shanahan, USA (Ret.) and LTC Garry J. Beavers, USA, "Information Operations in Bosnia," *Military Review*, Vol. LXXVII, No. 6 (November-December 1997), p. 59.

⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *B/H CAAT V Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Transition* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, Unclassified, Distribution Limited, May 1997), p. 55.

⁵ LTC Craig Jones, USA (Ret.), "The IO Process," *News From the Front!*, Center for Army Lessons Learned (March-April 1998), pp. 1-8.

⁶ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *B/H CAAT V Initial Impressions Report – Task Force Eagle Transition*, p. 22.

⁷ Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC, Information Operations Division, Brochure, *Information Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 22 January 1997), p. 10.

⁸ LTC Stephen W. Shanahan, USA (Ret.) and LTC Garry J. Beavers, USA, "Information Operations in Bosnia," p. 53.

⁹ See Land Information Warfare Activity, *Student Materials: Introduction to Information Campaign Planning and Execution* (Vienna, Va.; SYTEX Inc., May 1998), Section 4.

¹⁰ For a comparison of the targeting models, see LTC Steven Curtis, CPT Robert A.B. Curriss, Division Artillery, 1st Armored Division and Mr. Marc Romanych, TFE LIWA, "Integrating Targeting and Information Operations in Bosnia," *Field Artillery*, HQDA PB6-98-4 (July-August 1998), pp. 31-36.

¹¹ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 6-7.


¹² In MND-N, the Nordic-Polish Brigade Press and Information Officer (PIO) performed this function. In the other Brigades, the IO Officer was selected from the operations or fire support staff. One of the lessons learned on conducting IO in Multinational Operations (MNOs) is that the national military contingents will conduct IO with unique styles reflecting their national doctrines and practices. Center for Army Lessons Learned, CALLCOMS Observation 10000-71410, "National Military Contingents Conduct Information Operations with Unique Styles" (Unclassified, Distributed Limited).

¹³ During Operation JOINT FORGE in SFOR 4, this position alternated between these two individuals based on experience level and time "in-country."

¹⁴ See Land Information Warfare Activity, *Student Materials: Introduction to Information Campaign Planning and Execution*, Section 2.

¹⁵ Ibid., Section 1. The text states that the "PMO guide the actions of the International Police Task Force," which implies a close relationship.

¹⁶ See CALLCOMS Observation 10005-32963, "IPTF helps TFE planning and situational awareness during operations," in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *B/H CAAT 9 Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, Unclassified, Distribution Limited), Appendix A, p. A-70.



¹⁷ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 3-0.

¹⁸ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, **Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations** (Washington, DC,: USGPO, Unclassified, Distribution Limited, 11 January 1993), pp.6-2 and 6-3.

¹⁹ Center for Army Lessons Learned, **Newsletter 96-8, Joint Military Commissions** (September 1996), p. II-2.

²⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 16 June 1995), p. IV-9.

²¹ LTC Stephen W. Shanahan, USA (Ret.) and LTC Garry Beavers, USA, "Information Operations in Bosnia," p. 58. The authors describe both the JMC and POLAD meetings as IO "mediums."

²² See CALLCOMS Observation 10000-10906, "**POLAD obtains the commander's CCIR for a MND operation from a private organization that is a significant actor in the AO**," in Center for Army Lessons Learned, **B/H CAAT 9 Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations** (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, Appendix A), p. A-63.

²³ Land Information Warfare Activity, **Student Materials: Introduction to Information Campaign Planning and Execution**, Section 1.

²⁴ In Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD, this was the Division PSYOP Support Element (DPSE), and, in Operation JOINT FORGE, it was the Division PSYOP Product Development Detachment (DPDD) cell.

²⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07**, p. IV-9.

²⁶ Associated Press, "NATO Troops Seize Bosnian Croat Materiel," *Stars and Stripes*, Vol. 57, No. 268 (10 January 1999), p. 3.

²⁷ Public Information Office, Headquarters SFOR, Sarajevo Bosnia, *AM News*, 9 January 1999, p. 1.

²⁸ Coalition Press Information Center, Headquarters SFOR, Sarajevo, *Media Analysis*, 11 January 1999.


²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, G-2, OSINT, *Tuzla Night Owl*, Vol. 4, No. 13 (January 14, 1999), p. 14.

³¹ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, **Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 30 December 1994, hereafter cited as **Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations**), p. 15.

³² See Coalition Press Information Center, Multinational Division-North, Eagle Base, Tuzla Bosnia, *Weekly Media Messages for Commanders*, 12 January 1999.

³³ **Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations**, p. 31.



Chapter Three

Command and Control Warfare (C²W)

Operations Security - (OPSEC)


Security Training

Task Force Eagle initiated Security Awareness Training for the Security Managers on the enlarged Division Staff. This training was intended to ensure that basic security practices were being followed in the staff, which supports OPSEC by ensuring that classified information is not compromised. Although OPSEC is an *Operations* function and not a *Security* function,¹ consistent application of proper security measures ensures that classified information is not compromised, which is the essential pre-requisite for effective OPSEC. Security managers are responsible for the proper handling, transmittal, storage, management, and destruction of classified documents and information. "Unlike security programs that seek to protect classified information, OPSEC is concerned with identifying, controlling, and protecting the generally unclassified evidence that is associated with operations and activities. **OPSEC and security programs must be closely coordinated** to ensure that all aspects of sensitive operations are protected."²

OPSEC, information security (INFOSEC), and physical security in a multinational peace operations force are more complicated than in U.S.-only, or allied operation (e.g., NATO-only). In multinational operations outside of an alliance framework, such as the NATO-led multinational peace operations in Bosnia, INFOSEC and OPSEC challenges multiply. One of the additional INFOSEC challenges in such a multinational setting were the new, unique, and unfamiliar classifications created for SFOR. These included SECRET REL SFOR, Confidential REL SFOR, SFOR SECRET, SFOR Confidential, and SFOR-Restricted,³ which co-existed side by side with NATO classifications for the NATO elements of SFOR, and U.S.-only classifications, with which the security managers were already familiar. Given that new staff members were rotating into the staff all the time as individual replacement augmentees, such training was critical to ensuring that the procedures associated with these new classifications were thoroughly understood.

*"Education provides the concepts and knowledge to develop appropriate policies, procedures, and operations to protect joint force information systems. Training develops the skills and abilities required to operate while mitigating joint force vulnerabilities."*⁴

--Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations



The Task Force Eagle Security Awareness classes were presented on a weekly basis for the security managers of the division staff sections and cells. The primary instructor was the Special Security Officer (SSO) Non-Commissioned Officer In-Charge (NCOIC), who organized the classes into blocks of one hour or less. The classes were announced at the Division Chief of Staff update meetings, and over e-mail to identified Staff Section and Cell Security Managers. Attendance was tracked and reported to the Chief of Staff. Topics covered the gamut of INFOSEC concerns from security containers to emergency evacuation and destruction to classification guidance. The classes also provided the SSO an opportunity to review the division's policies with the Security Managers.

In November 1998, the LIWA deployed a Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) to Task Force Eagle (TFE) to conduct an OPSEC survey and vulnerability assessment of TFE operations. The VAT not only performed that task, but trained over 200 personnel in OPSEC, contributing to an improved OPSEC program within TFE. The LIWA VATs analyze, investigate, and survey unit operations to assess the vulnerability of the deployed force to adversary IO or C²W sabotage, deception and attack and to assess their ability to maintain personnel and security programs and protect such facilities.⁵ Although deployed to conduct an OPSEC Survey or Vulnerability Assessment of TFE, the LIWA VAT also conducted training sessions for OPSEC officers, commanders, and staff officers or NCOs on OPSEC. The background and experience of the VAT members made them more than qualified to conduct this kind of training. Their employment in this manner demonstrates a legitimate additional mission for LIWA VATs, especially as IO doctrine and TTPs are still developing.


Lessons Learned: *The application of the LIWA VAT to the task of training OPSEC to a deployed force is an excellent example of the tenet of agility in MOOTW. "In operations other than war, as commanders perceive changes to their environment, they devise imaginative methods of applying their resources to those changes and act quickly to gain or maintain control of the environment."⁶ The LIWA VAT is a unique resource to the commander in MOOTW that can improve his OPSEC programs in a variety of ways.*

Task Force Eagle's Security Awareness Training provides an example of how U.S. forces participating in multinational peace operations can enhance their INFOSEC and OPSEC on a routine basis. "Peacetime operations are usually long-term commitments."⁷ They also follow a more predictable operations temp or OPTEMPO, and thus better provide the necessary conditions for planning and executing routine training than would be the case in short-term, high-OPTEMPO combat operations. The high degree of visibility this training achieved through reporting to the Division Chief of Staff ensured it had appropriate command emphasis to be taken seriously. This approach should be considered for any division engaged in peace operations and should start early in the operation to make it standing operating procedure.

OPSEC Threats in Peace Operations.

In the Nordic-Polish (Nord-Pol) Brigade, the senior IO officer was the Brigade Press Information Officer (PIO). On one occasion, the Nord-Pol PIO suspected that insistent repeated requests for interviews from a Serbian News Service *SRNA*, were a thin cover for a surreptitious use of the media to conduct intelligence collection operations against SFOR on behalf of the radical elements of the Bosnian Serb political leadership.

In peace operations, adversary IO may include the surreptitious use of the media under false pretenses to conduct intelligence collection on the peace operations force. Such intelligence could support, among other things, adversary IO in the form of well-crafted propaganda and disinformation in the form of either false press stories or rumors. Joint Doctrine for MOOTW recognizes the OPSEC threat posed by "the possibility of media attempts to



acquire and publicly disseminate classified information."⁸ In discussing OPSEC, FM 100-6 mentions that "the inevitable presence of the news media during military operations complicates OPSEC...(and) could be a lucrative source of information to an adversary."⁹ Doctrine cautions commanders, staff officers and soldiers to "balance OPSEC and other operational requirements when working with the media."¹⁰

In the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the press was merely an organ of control for the government during the communist era. The emancipation of the media from political control has not yet been entirely achieved in the former Yugoslavia. In some of the former Yugoslav republics, and in the Bosnian entities, the press may either be suppressed, or used as a tool to spread propaganda or collect information. Displaying trademark former communist tendencies, the FWFs have had few qualms about "using deception, trickery, or civilian-run enterprises...such as the media."¹¹


Prohibitions on Photography.

Photography of sites by soldiers of the peace operations force represents a serious OPSEC risk. Photography of sites occupied or used by the peace operations force should be prohibited. Army Peace Operations doctrine explains that prohibition of photography of sites occupied or used by the peace operations force is a standard OPSEC measure.¹² At Task Force Eagle Base Camps, signs are posted at all entries prohibiting photography, which apply to SFOR forces and local nationals alike. However, inside the compounds, soldiers and U.S. civilian contracted personnel are permitted to take photographs. Many of these photographs are taken on conventional film which had been processed through the Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) Post Exchange (PX) out to contracted local-national (host-nation, or HN) film processing facilities for developing.

A more serious OPSEC challenge is represented in the capabilities of digital photography. Digital photography is more rapidly disseminated over e-mail and the Internet via homepages. As the NATO-led peace operations matured, more and more information has been posted on the Internet on the SFOR, the U.S. European Command (U.S. EUCOM), Task Force Eagle, and unit Family Support Group home pages. As digital cameras, already sold through the AAFES PX, become less and less expensive, more soldiers will be equipped with this new photographic technology. OPSEC experts advise that the only way to effectively combat the problem is to establish a clear policy on the use of photographic equipment on base camps and operational sites.

Two important sources of imagery products in support of operations are the Combat Camera and the Mobile Public Affairs Detachments. Any policy on photography would have to accommodate these important sources of imagery products. The photographs taken by these two groups would be either be "cleared on site," or reviewed by the OPSEC before publication. "Cleared on site" means that the OPSEC officer provides guidance before taking pictures on what areas are off-limits. For those situations not cleared in advance, the OPSEC officer would review the photos before publication over command information products and the Internet. Doctrine states that public affairs units should achieve OPSEC "through security at the source and operational security awareness."¹³ "Security at the source" is the same as "cleared on site."

An effective command policy on photography of sites would recognize that soldiers are proud of what they do, and will want to take photographs, but would provide clear guidance on which situations and locations were authorized for personal photography. Under this policy, no aerial photography would be allowed, except by the Combat Camera and MPADs. Under such a policy, designated areas would be marked for authorized outside group shots, for example, in front of a unit sign or marker, or in front of a crew vehicle. Usually, what appears in the background of such photographs is a greater risk to OPSEC than is the subject of the photo itself. A simple policy



allowing personal photography inside living areas, but not in operational areas or security would be a significant step in the right direction. Such a policy would achieve OPSEC while still allowing soldiers to take photographs of their comrades and while allowing Public Affairs to accomplish its missions of providing command and public information on operations to American forces and the American public.

In addition to the OPSEC risk posed by digital still cameras, hand-held video cameras pose an OPSEC risk as well. Many soldiers in TFE have taken their personally owned light, portable, hand-held video cameras around the basecamp and on patrol to make video tapes which are subsequently sent home in the mail. Video cameras are an important peace operations tool, but when used for personal purposes, represent an additional OPSEC risk.¹⁴ Guidance on the use of video cameras should be included in the command photography of sites policy.

Without any guidance on what may be photographed, soldiers may quite easily, and unknowingly, take photographs of classified aspects of either operations or infrastructure inside the peace operations force compounds. If these photographs are then developed by HN film processors, the information is leaked and an OPSEC failure results. Digital photographs, that is, photographs taken with digital cameras, represent a serious OPSEC challenge as the dissemination of such pictures worldwide is possible with a few key strokes.

Lesson Learned: *Prohibitions on photography must be sufficiently restrictive and stated in a command policy to reduce OPSEC risks to the peace operations force. Outside of authorized areas, only official photography should be allowed, and OPSEC officers must either clear photography on site, or review all official photographs selected for publication in open sources. OPSEC experts advise that only any policy will require OPSEC training and awareness programs for the soldier if it is to be truly effective in containing the OPSEC risk posed by both conventional film and new digital technology photographic systems.*

OPSEC and Communications Security (COMSEC) in MOOTW.

Use of non-secure radio communications in support of day-to-day operations and convoys poses a COMSEC risk to the peace operations force. In Task Force Eagle the use of non-tactical, unsecure hand-held transceivers of military and civilian origin had proliferated to the point that their use represented a COMSEC risk to the force. Motorola "brick" radios, AN/PRC 127s, and even commercially obtained two-way radios of civilian manufacture are in wide use throughout TFE in support of daily operations and convoys. The uncontrolled use of such radios may potentially result in the compromise of critical information.

Army peace operations doctrine emphasizes that "communications security (COMSEC) is as important in peace operations as it is conventional military operations. Belligerent parties can monitor telephone lines and radios."¹⁵ Adversaries employing simple "Radio-Shack" police scanner-type technology to intercept friendly force radio traffic would easily obtain convoy and patrol departure times, computer passwords, VIP locations and movements. Unsupervised use of these systems to transmit such information unencoded with even the simplest means available, such as brevity codes or codewords, represent a significant OPSEC threat.

Because of the multinational character of most peace operations, interchangeable secure communications systems are typically unavailable, resulting in most transmissions being in the clear. Published TTPs to achieve proper COMSEC in multinational peace operations direct that "when transmitting (sensitive information) in the clear, the peacekeeping force's communications can be monitored by the belligerents, the media, or other interested parties...**use brevity codes or secure means of transmission.**"¹⁶ Sensitive information, such as locations, size, or identity of the Entity Armed Forces, equipment deployments, matters relating to the deployment of the reserve force or Quick-Reaction Force (QRF), and movements, "**must always be encoded to preclude a compromise.**"¹⁷



Lesson Learned: *The use of non-tactical, unsecure hand-held transceivers in peace operations must be controlled with a view toward the OPSEC and COMSEC implications associated with their use. At a minimum, users should be cautioned about the nature of information transmitted over such systems, and the use of codewords and brevity matrixes should be the standard.*


Psychological Operations - (PSYOP)

PSYOP product approval process versus the commander's message approval process.

Both PA and PSYOP are part of the IO Staff during both peace and war, and similar processes are employed to approve their messages. Doctrinally, the PSYOP peacetime product approval process' requirements remain in effect in all peacetime operations, including peace operations. The approval chain is a direct line from the psychological operations task force (POTF)¹⁸ to the Task Force Commander to the CINC to the National Command Authority (NCA). For most missions, the NCA delegates this authority to the CINC, who then may pass it to the Task Force Commander.¹⁹ The PSYOP product approval process to get a product on the street may take only a few hours, or may be measured in weeks.²⁰

The process for approving commander's themes and messages for Information Operations other than PSYOP was a combined staff approach that produced a set of targeted commander's themes and messages oriented toward specific audiences. The Draft themes and messages, crafted by the IO Staff, were presented to the commander for approval. In developing these themes and messages, the IO Cell had the subject matter expertise in the IOWG to ensure the messages were consistent with the mission. The SJA representative to the IOWG ensured these messages are consistent with the terms of reference (TOR) authorizing the peace operation, U.S. laws, and the peace agreement. The PA representative to the IOWG and the senior PA official ensured they are written to have appropriate media appeal. The JMC representative to the IOWG ensures that messages oriented to the military forces of the FWFs were phrased to achieve their intended effect. The PMO representative provided his analysis on messages targeted at the local police forces. And the entire IOWG provided input on the messages to the general population and business leaders.

These approved messages could be disseminated through the other IO means available to the division, such as 1) Press Statements from the MND-N CPIC; 2) talking points provided to the commanders for their commander's radio shows; 3) commanders' meetings with local authorities; 4) JMC bi-lateral commissions with the EAFs, and; 5) Civil Affairs meetings with local authorities. However, PSYOP product approval procedures remain separate from the Division's process for approving the commander's public information messages. By law and Joint/Army doctrine, PA operators will not focus on directing or manipulating foreign or domestic public actions or opinions. The PA's mission is to report newsworthy events without bias. The PAO must ensure that press conferences and statements follow these constraints.



To produce a PSYOP product in support of an IO effort, the Division PSYOP Development Detachment (DPDD)²¹ required approval from the CJICTF, which operated as the POTF. This separate approval process meant that PSYOP was not operating at the same speed as the division in preparing messages for dissemination. Having two parallel approval processes operating at different speeds sometimes meant that PSYOP was not ready to produce a product as fast as the division would have liked. However, the PSYOP product approval process as practiced in OJF was doctrinally and legally correct and is likely to be the same in future operations.

However, the fact that the division commander had approved messages that were already being disseminated by other means made it easier for the DPDD to make its case for product approval and obtain such approval faster. If the division commander was already disseminating the message, they could argue, then PSYOP should support with a product with the same message. The message was going out on the street with or without PSYOP, but it would be more effective if supported by PSYOP. The product approval worksheet explained the approved commander's public information messages and how the PSYOP product would support them.


The preceding arguments must be taken with a note of caution, which is that the IO Cell should not propose messages for the commander which are inconsistent with alliance, coalition, or U.S. Government policy. Tactical-level IO must be "nested" with themes and messages approved at higher levels of command.

Nothing in current Army IO doctrine (FM 100-6, 27 August 1996) addresses the process by which IO themes and messages are approved. PSYOP doctrine (FM 33-1, 18 February 1993) does explain the PSYOP product approval process, but does not explain how PSYOP products will be created alongside other IO "products" in the form of commander's messages disseminated through other than PSYOP means. Future revisions of both doctrines should note the relationship between these two processes.

Lesson Learned: *Events will occur that are not specifically addressed in current PSYOP themes and messages expressed in readily available products. In these instances, the IO Cell and the greater IO Staff may develop more precisely focused messages that apply general themes to particular problem sets for the Commander's approval. These messages can then be disseminated via FRAGOs to the force for dissemination through other than PSYOP channels. This allows the entire force to "speak with one voice" and to exercise the commander's public information program to the local population. In this manner, the commander maintains the flexibility and agility to rapidly disseminate messages to targeted audiences. This process also serves to accelerate the approval process for PSYOP products developed in support of such events.*

Division-Level PSYOP Products.

The Division PSYOP element developed its own printed PSYOP product in the form of a magazine entitled *Exclusive*, providing the division a product focused exclusively on the target audience within the division's AOR. One of the significant criticisms from U.S. PSYOP personnel of the printed PSYOP products produced by the CJICTF and disseminated by the divisions during Operation JOINT GUARD was their lack of relevance to the issues specific to each MND area of responsibility (AOR). While PSYOP planners complained of "overly generalized products that covered general themes and which were applicable to a broader target audience, but which did not specifically support the division commander's needs..." they did provide a start point for further action.²² The PSYOP products produced by the CJICTF were, by necessity, generalized so as to apply to the entire theater. Written in general form, these products provided forces a starting point and great latitude to "build on" to the message to apply them more precisely to their area of operations. The *Exclusive* is an example of building on and focusing the higher product to a target audience.




Responding to the PSYOP imperative of *Adaptability*,²³ the MND-N DPDD (formerly the Division PSYOP Support Element or DPSE) developed its own printed product that would more precisely target the populace in the division AOR and respond to the needs of the commander. The DPDD developed the format of the new *Exclusive* to meet the needs of the commander in addressing issues of importance to the local populace, and provide a means to communicate a more precise message within his AOR. The first issue was built on articles submitted by TF Commanders and focused on areas of cooperation between SFOR and the community in construction projects, humanitarian assistance projects, items of general interest in the AOR, and light entertainment in the form of a horoscope and "top ten" music lists.

The *Exclusive* was targeted at a broader audience than either the *Herald of Progress*, which was oriented exclusively to adults, or the *Mirko*, which was oriented primarily to teen-age children. The market audience for the *Exclusive* included both segments, and also devoted a page to the younger audience with the inclusion of a "children's page."

The *Exclusive* began as a monthly publication produced by the DPDD and was intended for dissemination throughout all of MND-N. The first issue of the publication was compiled from the input of division staff elements, The American Brigade and each Task Force Commander. The objective of the *Exclusive* was to inform the citizenry in the MND-N AOR of the positive aspects of SFOR's presence and to provide commanders the opportunity to communicate messages targeted at their AOR.

Five thousand copies of the first issue were produced and disseminated in the troubled city of Brcko. The DPDD used its organic printing capabilities (Risograph) to produce the inaugural issue. The significant challenge to this method was having to manually fold the magazines – a project which required over 80 manhours. An effort similar to the MND-N DPDD's *Exclusive* was also occurring at the same time in MND-SW, where that MND produced a weekly eight-page, full-color newsletter called the *Mostavi*. Each division sought to provide a PSYOP product more sharply focused on the needs of their commander and the citizenry in their AOR. The CJICTF agreed to pay for the production of a combined newsletter that would be identified by different names in each MND AOR, but containing stories from all the MNDs to make it a standard product. The newsletter would contain the same set of stories in each MND, but be presented in a different order, according to the preferences of the MND PSYOP or Public Information Officer. Additionally, the title banner and announcements on the cover would be unique in each MND. Initial plans for the new combined newsletter were for it to start as a bi-weekly and then move to a weekly publication when procedures were refined.



The new combined product was to be printed at separate facilities in each MND AOR, with the various inputs from the MNDs being transmitted electronically to each of the three production sites for layout in accordance with the format to be established in each MND. Until that procedure was in place, initial issues of the combined product were to be printed in MND-SW through a contracted printing service. The combined product was expected to cost about 40,000_{DM} per week.


"The peacekeeping force commander may determine there is a need to inform and educate HN civilians and belligerents about the peacekeeping force...The peacekeeping force commander has the prerogative in requesting support for information and education programs."²⁴

--FM 33-1, Psychological Operations

The initial strategy for MND-N was to rotate responsibility for articles to the Brigades to reduce the frequency that each unit would have to produce an article. A planned feature for the new MND-N portion of the combined product was to publish sections of the General Framework on the Agreement for Peace (GFAP, a.k.a. the Dayton Peace Accord or DPA), so that local citizens would have their own copy of the peace agreement after collecting several issues of the publication. Also planned for MND-N was the publication of the schedule for the unit Commander's Radio Shows in the MND.

Lesson Learned: *Joint PSYOP doctrine includes publicizing beneficial reforms and programs associated with the peace settlement among the PSYOP objectives for MOOTW.²⁵ Army PSYOP doctrine puts the commander at the heart of this process. By developing a division AOR-specific PSYOP product in the form of the Exclusive, the MND-N DPDD responded to the commander's need for more precisely focused products to accomplish that mission in his AOR. The publication of the peace settlement, in this case the GFAP, allowed the commander to provide critical information to the local populace to understand the mandate for the peace operations force and what the parties to the agreement had committed their peoples to abide.*

The *Exclusive* also expanded the set of IO tools by which to communicate IO messages, providing increased flexibility in options when planning IO campaigns. The efforts of the MND-N DPDD in conceiving of and ultimately publishing a division-level magazine-style PSYOP product represent a new direction for PSYOP products in peace operations. The combined aspect of the product allows for optimal efficiency in production costs and results in a more complete product. The combined product still follows the centralized product approval process, but reflects the needs of the division commanders. By sharing the basic building blocks of the product, i.e., stories and articles, but applying their own layout and design concepts, each division achieved a stylized product that met its unique requirements.



Using the Peace Accord as a PSYOP Message.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, in the third year of the NATO-led peace enforcement operations in Bosnia, the Task Force Eagle Division PSYOP Development Detachment published the Peace Agreement in its printed products to achieve both C²-Protect and C²-Attack effects.

In any peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, there will be some formal agreement between the warring factions, which details the nature of the peace to be kept or enforced. The agreement frames the mandate authorizing the peace operation and the specific Terms of Reference which define the powers, missions, roles, and responsibilities of the peace operations force.²⁶ The agreement which ended open hostilities among the three FWFs in Bosnia Herzegovina was the General Framework on the Agreement for Peace (GFAP, a.k.a. the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), or Dayton Accord (DA)).


The GFAP framed the context of all military and diplomatic intercourse among the FWFs, binding the political and military leadership to its points. However, throughout the general population, the average person did not know its details even three years after its signing. This information vacuum was an invitation to misinformation, deliberate disinformation, and propaganda.

Demonstrating the degree to which the accord had become less familiar over time, the President of the Republika Srpska, one of the two entities created by the accord, stated in a December 1998 interview that "the DA is a magic or a religious document and its spirit needs to be explained."²⁷ To that end, the DPDD planned to publish the GFAP in a handbook form and installments in the Division's PSYOP magazine product *Exclusive* in 1999.

By publishing the text of the peace agreement in the local language and alphabet, the DPDD contributed to "maintain(ing) the consent of the local populace and belligerents concerning the presence of a peacekeeping force."²⁸ This effort also served a C²-Protect function of countering adversary propaganda by filling the information vacuum before adversaries could. Indirectly, this tactic served as a C²-Attack option by "attacking the legitimacy and credibility" of those opposed to the peace settlement.²⁹ Those who violated the agreement would now have to risk judgment by the people, now educated on the agreement, on their conduct vis-à-vis the points in the peace accord itself. By discrediting those opposed to the peace process, PSYOP is "driving a wedge between the adversary leadership and its populace to undermine the adversary leadership's confidence and effectiveness."³⁰

Lesson Learned: *Publishing the peace agreement through PSYOP products achieved both C²-Protect and C²-Attack goals. As regards C²-Protect, this tactic provided the local populace the means to judge for themselves whether or not the entity political and military leadership was following the provisions of the treaty, and to cut through propaganda and misinformation and make their own assessments. Publishing the facts prevented misinformation, rumor, and propaganda about what was written in the agreement. As regards C²-Attack, it put those elements opposed to the peace agreement on the defensive as their credibility and influence were threatened by dissemination of the truth.*

TTP: Future peace operations will likely have a published treaty or accord to which the FWFs commit to support. By publishing the agreement in installments over several issues of PSYOP printed products, the local populace was encouraged to collect the products to have their own reference. This also meant that each issue of the printed products maintained its balance with attention to other subjects.



Unit-Level Information Operations.

In MND-N, U.S. Forces used existing radio stations as an INFOSYS through which they were able to communicate directly to the local populace in the Area of Responsibility. The practice of broadcasting civil-military information over civilian radio stations in a "talk-show" format began during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and continued to grow in Operation JOINT GUARD.³¹ At first, the PSYOP staff officer arranged radio interviews with local radio stations for BN TF Commander, XO, and other officials. These interviews were both live and recorded for airing at a later time. Before the interview would take place, the PSYOP staff officer would obtain the questions the interviewer would ask, and would suggest issues important to the success of the SFOR mission that the commander would like to talk about. The PSYOP cell would prepare answers to the questions provided and get the SJA and PAO staff officers to review the questions and answers to ensure synchronization. The commander could then review the question and answer report and use it as preparatory tool before the interview, or as a crutch during the interview.




Unit-level Information Operations Broadcast over Radio Kamalon, 102.7 FM, in the Tuzla Valley during OJF.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, American forces in TFE expanded the practice of using local radio stations as a platform from which to conduct information operations by securing the cooperation of more local radio station managers to broadcast military radio shows. During Operation JOINT FORGE, the American Task Force operating out of Camp Bedrock expanded its effort to include a total of five radio

stations in the Tuzla Valley.³² The shows were "live" and included answering listener call-in questions about the peace accord, as well as questions about the peace operations force and its mission.

The Battalion Task Force operating out of Camp Dobol also expanded the radio operations begun during Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT FORGE, broadcasting from the nearby city of *Kladanj* and *Zvornik*.³³ In both of these unit-level efforts, the Division Public Affairs Office assisted the unit commanders in preparing for and executing the on-air broadcasts by providing the weekly "Media Guidance to Commanders." Additionally, the Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) assisted the commander in preparing for the specific interview by providing tips on what to expect and how to handle loaded or unexpected lines of questioning and stay to the desired message.

Task Force Eagle's use of existing civilian radio facilities is an example of co-opting the INFOSYS of the FWFs during peace operations. The radio shows enhance force protection for TFE soldiers by allowing the peace operations force to communicate directly with the local populace, thereby sidestepping the FWF leadership altogether and removing unnecessary filters from the communications process. Some FWF leaders remained opposed to the implementation of the peace accord. Sidestepping these leaders allowed the peace operations force to appeal to the citizenry to put pressure on these leaders to support the objectives of the peace operations force. By communicating directly to the local populace, the peace operations force is able to defeat hostile propaganda directed against the friendly force by those opposed to the peace accord.



Lesson Learned: *Units as small as battalion task forces can contribute to the execution of the peace operations information campaign by co-opting civilian INFOSYS to broadcast messages that support information campaign themes. Co-opting existing civilian radio infrastructure to broadcast IO messages in a radio talk show format allows the peace operations force commander to communicate directly to the local populace and enhances force protection by removing barriers to cooperation and understanding.*

TTPs for the Preparation and Execution of the Commander's Radio Shows in OJF.


Battalion Task Force and Company Commanders conducted radio shows in support of IO aimed at the local populace. These shows co-opted existing civilian radio networks to provide new platforms from which to disseminate IO messages, refute misinformation, and defeat adversary propaganda. Joint and Army Peace Operations doctrines already recognize that "such local information programs as radio...newscasts...can help ensure that the peacekeeping objectives and efforts are fully understood and supported by the parties in the conflict and their civilian populations...such efforts can help counter rumors and disinformation."³⁴ However, the details of just how to implement such a program are unstated in peace operations and psychological operations doctrine and TTP manuals. The TTPs provided here should be documented in the next iteration of these manuals.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, American forces in TFE expanded the use of using local radio stations as a platform from which to conduct IO by securing the cooperation of more local radio station managers to broadcast military radio shows.³⁵ Battalion Task Force and Company Commanders conducted radio shows over local FM and AM radio stations to deliver IO messages and to refute adversary propaganda and misinformation in the press and local rumor. As the use of civilian radio stations expanded, Company Commanders increasingly found themselves supporting the Division's IO as they conducted radio shows in a "talk-show" format over local stations.

The procedure for conducting the radio shows starts with the tactical PSYOP team (TPT) identifying which radio stations are willing to cooperate in airing a "talk show" in the question and answer format featuring an American officer discussing the peace operation. The shows were both "live" and pre-recorded for broadcast at a later time. The TPT negotiated the rate per minute to pay for the show, and set the date and time for the show. Usually, the radio station manager provided a list of questions to the TPT a few days in advance of the show. Once the show had aired a few times, local listeners called in questions to the station throughout the week in anticipation of the next show. At first, these questions came from the journalists who worked for or with the radio station. The initial set of questions were then provided to the interpreters for translation into English while still at the station if any further clarification is required. Occasionally, these questions were provided via e-mail directly to the TPT.

Once the questions were delivered to the TF Command Post, they were reviewed by the Mobile Public Affairs Detachment and compared to the Weekly Media Guidance for Commanders, published by the Senior PA Officer of the Division (the Coalition Press Information Center Director). The Weekly Media Guidance (WMG) to Commanders included a special section devoted to radio shows entitled "Tips for Commander's Radio Shows." Additionally, the WMG provided IO messages targeted to civil authorities, civic leaders, and public officials.

Before the show aired, the TF or Company Commander arrived at the station to review the questions once again to confirm them. The commander informed the station manager whether or not he wanted to take "call-in" questions from the listening audience. The shows usually interspersed music in between periods of questions and answers. Typically, about 10 or so questions were provided up front by the station manager. When call-in questions were included in the radio show, they were written down by the radio station's telephone receptionist and handed to the interpreter for explanation. The commander could then accept or reject any question called in without having to interact with anyone other than the host. This allowed the commander to review the questions for suitability and prevented him from having to deal directly with zealots on the phone while "on the air."



TF Commander at Radio Sekovici refuting rumors and defeating hostile propaganda following the arrest of a high-profile PIFWC.

Upon completion of a "live" show, or faithful broadcasting of a pre-recorded show, the TPT paid the station the agreed-upon rate using Field Ordering Officer and Class A Agent procedures for field-ordering of services. For shows pre-recorded for later broadcast, the TPT would withhold payment for non-compliance with the contractual agreement in the event the show was not aired faithfully.

The commander's radio show proved to be a very responsive IO tool that allowed the commander to bypass elements opposed to the implementation of the peace settlement to reach the people directly and discuss the goals of the peace operations force.

Additionally, it is one of the fastest

means by which IO messages can be delivered in response to crisis events. The sensational arrest of a very high-profile Person Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWC), General Krstic of the Bosnian Serb Army, on 02 December 1998, provides an example of where the Commander's Radio Show provided a quick and flexible IO tool to apply to the rising tensions that followed the arrest. The TF Commander was able to refute rumors and defeat adversary propaganda concerning the alleged torture of the PIFWC and his driver on the air directly to the people within the range of the station in the towns of Sekovici and Vlasenica. Army PSYOP doctrine notes that "crises can be averted when using truth to counter rumors, disinformation, and misrepresentation of facts," which can be accomplished through public information programs.³⁶

Lesson Learned: *The TTPs established by Task Force Eagle may be emulated in future peace operations. The basic steps involved are:*

- PSYOP teams identify, locate, and visit local radio stations to negotiate the radio show.
- The local station manager provides the TPT the questions to be asked during the show, which follows a question-and-answer "talk-show" format.
- These questions are translated on the spot, and then sent to the PA element supporting that unit for review. The JAG may also need to review the questions in some cases.
- The commander arrives early at the station to confirm the questions with the show host.
- Call-in questions, if accepted, are written down throughout the show and handed to the commander during the "music breaks" during the show. The commander reviews the questions for suitability and accepts or rejects them.
- Following the broadcast of the show, the TPT pays for the services using Field Ordering Officer and Class A Agent procedures for ordering field services.☺



Endnotes, Chapter Three:

¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*, Joint Publication 3-54, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 January 1997), p. vi.

² Ibid., p. I-1.

³ REL meaning "releasable to."

⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 09 October 1998), p. III-3.

⁵ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Information Operations*, Field Manual 100-6 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 August 1996, hereafter cited as *Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations*), p. B-3.

⁶ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 14 June 1993), p. 2-7.

⁷ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*, Field Manual 100-7 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 31 May 1995), p. 8-5.

⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 16 June 1995, hereafter cited as *Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*), p. IV-6.

⁹ *Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations*, p. 3-3.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 2-6.

¹¹ MAJ Erin Gallogly-Staver, USA, and MAJ Raymond S. Hilliard, USA, "Information Warfare: Opposing Force (OPFOR) Doctrine -- An Integrated Approach," *News From the Front!*, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth KS, September-October 1997, p. 13.

¹² Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Peace Operations*, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 30 December 1994, hereafter cited as *Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations*), p. 36.

¹³ Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, p. IV-6.

¹⁴ See CALLCOMS Observation 10007-17500, "Video Cameras as Information Operations Tools During Peace Enforcement Operations," published in *B/H Combined Arms Assessment Team 9 Initial Impressions Report, Operation JOINT GUARD: Task Force Eagle Operations* (Fort Leavenworth KS: CALL, Unclassified, Distribution Limited, March 1998, hereafter cited as *B/H CAAT 9 Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations*), p. A-55.

¹⁵ *Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations*, p. 36.

¹⁶ Fort Riley, "Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Combined Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises," Draft (Fort Riley, KS, November 1995), p. 16.

¹⁷ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: USGPO), 29 April 1994, p. VII-5.

¹⁸ During the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia, the POTF was known as the Coalition Joint Information Campaign Task Force, or CJICTF.

¹⁹ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Psychological Operations*, Field Manual 33-1 (Washington, DC: USGPO, Unclassified, Distribution Limited, hereafter cited as *Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations*), 18 February 1993, p. C-1.

²⁰ *B/H CAAT 9, Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations*, p. A-91.

²¹ PSYOP forces do not have DPDDs. Recently, the PSYOP force structure was changed to authorize tactical DPDDs. At the earliest, these detachments will be available for use in 2002. For TFE, PSYOP assets were organized under the DPDD concepts prior to deployment.



²² *B/H CAAT 9, Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations*, p. 52.

²³ See **Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations**, p. 3-25. The manual states that "PSYOP personnel adapt to methods and structures and help develop new ones suited for each mission."

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3-28.

²⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, Joint Publication 3-53* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 10 July 1996), p. V-2.

²⁶ **Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations**, p. 15. See also, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, Field Manual 100-20* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 5 December 1990), p. 4-8.

²⁷ Interview with the RS President Nikola Poplasen. "Mother Country-Our Destiny," *The Night Owl*, The Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Cell, ACoS G2, 1st Cavalry Division, vol. 3, no. 363 (29 December 1998) .

²⁸ **Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations**, p. B-2. See also the "Peacekeeping" section, p. 3-28.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1-8.

³⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Publication 3-53* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 10 July 1996), p. I-8.

³¹ See CALLCOMS file number: 10000-01825, "PSYOP Radio Shows as Information Operations," in *B/H CAAT 9, Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations*, p. 76.


³² See SSG Pat Johnson, "America's Voice in Bosnia," *Talon*, vol. 4, no. 47 (13 November 1998), p. 10.

³³ See PFC Giovanni Lorente, "Working the Airwaves, Answering Questions for Bosnian Locals," *Talon*, vol. 4, no. 44, (23 October 1998), p. 11.

³⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 29 April 1994), p. VII-7. See also, **Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations**, p. 40, which makes a similar statement.

³⁵ See CALLCOMS observation 10000-15876, "Unit-Level Information Operations Co-opt Civilian Radio Networks."

³⁶ **Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations**, p. 3-28.



Chapter Four

Information Operations in a Multinational Force

National military contingents conduct Information Operations with unique styles.


Place operations are almost always multi-national in character. It follows then that IO conducted in unit AORs will reflect the different cultural backgrounds of the national military contingents. The variations in style, approach, and techniques of the national military contingents conducting IO will likely reflect the national values, beliefs, and cognitions¹ of the roles and techniques of media in their home nations. During OJF, the execution of IO varied among the national military contingents comprising the multinational peace operations force.

Radio Show operations in the Nord-Pol Bde, for example, were carried out quite differently from those conducted in the American Brigade sector.² Unlike the initial American radio shows, the Nordic-Polish Brigade (Nord-Pol Bde) radio shows were from the outset, managed and monitored not by PSYOP, but by the Press Information Officer, who performed the combined tasks of PSYOP and Public Affairs. In the U.S. Army, PSYOP and PA functions are clearly delineated, and kept separate by laws restricting PA from engaging in PSYOP. Although all PSYOP in the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia are based on truth and credible message, the imperative to maintain the credibility of information from PA sources requires this separation in the U.S. Army.

Another difference is that unlike the Americans, the Nord-Pol Bde did not pay for its radio shows. Instead of building a "network" of stations quickly by offering payment, the Nord-Pol Bde started a slower expansion of access to radio stations by demonstrating consistent goodwill toward the community and establishing trust with local radio station managers. The Nord-Pol Bde did not pay for any of its radio shows, which like their American counterparts, were usually an hour in length, but sometimes longer based on listener interest as measured by call-in questions.

The Nord-Pol Bde did not attempt to get the questions for the show in advance as was the practice in the American sector. Instead, the team of interpreter, Press Information Officer or Unit Commander, and any special guests would arrive at the station about 30 minutes early to review the main topics of discussion and together sit down to plan the show. The discussion began, however, with small talk designed to sustain and build the relationship and trust between the peace operations force and the media representatives. The Nord-Pol Bde spokesman politely suggested deferring some of the topics suggested by the radio show host that did not support his priorities of information, or for which he was not prepared. This effectively shaped the outline of the radio show to reflect the needs of the Bde. When asked to speak of strategic-level problems at the level of SFOR, the Bde spokesman merely declined to comment on the issue by saying that he "really had nothing prepared for that issue."

While the Nord-Pol Bde spokesman did not have a concrete list of the questions to be asked provided to him, he did have his own prepared notes built from the Division Information Operations FRAGOs, the Coalition Press Information Center Director's Media Guidance to Commanders, and any "talking points" provided by the Division Public Affairs. During the music breaks in the show, the Bde spokesman would politely suggest the direction for the show to take upon resuming. This was effective when done in a conversational tone that made no demands upon the host.




The Nord-Pol Bde radio shows would usually begin with a review of the humanitarian assistance projects under way in each Battalion sector. To make the show more personalized, the bde spokesman brought a compact-disc of music from his home country to play over the music breaks, which he left with the station as a gift. During the show, the Nord-Pol spokesman used the same technique for answering call-in questions as the Americans, namely having the question brought in to the sound booth written down for interpretation into English. During the music breaks, the spokesman could either accept or reject the question before going back on the air. This prevented the spokesman from having to decline questions on the air and thus appear evasive, or from having to battle with zealots in arguments that cannot be won.

Lesson Learned: *The various military contingents making up a multinational coalition will conduct IO with varying styles and techniques. The various styles often reflect national values, beliefs, and cognitions on the roles and techniques of media in their home nations.*

Neither FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations, nor FM 100-6, Information Operations, discusses the phenomena of unit-level information operations varying from national military contingent to national military contingent. This is nothing more than a planning consideration that must be kept in mind for U.S. military planners developing IO campaign strategy and supporting operations. FM 100-6 does note that the key to success is to "plan in a multi-national manner,"³ but lacks details. Differences in style and approach do exist and these differences will result in some variation in the manner of execution between national military contingents, and so planners should be aware of this from the beginning.

Building a Successful Information Campaign in Support of Peace Operations.

In Operation JOINT FORGE, the Nord-Pol Bde developed an information campaign to support an operation designed to collect hazardous unexploded ordnance and weapons from the local populace in its Area of Responsibility (AOR). Dubbed "Operation Harvest," the SFOR effort to collect unexploded ordnance (UXO) and weapons has been conducted on an annual basis throughout the SFOR AOR. The purpose of the program was to encourage local citizens to report the locations of known or found caches of UXO to SFOR or local authorities to remove the danger such UXO presented to the local populace. The goal of the program was to help accomplish the task of developing a "safe and secure environment" by removing dangerous weapons from the hands of the local populace and putting them under the control of the EAFs or destroying them. In peace operations designed to return the FWFs to normalcy, events along the way, such as elections, resettlements, weapons storage site inspections, represent problem sets that IO can address. The MND-N weapons and UXO collection operation is a classic example of a "problem set" to which the IO planning and execution process can be successfully applied.⁴



Nord-Pol Bde Press Concurrence, Doboï, 17 December 1998.

In the Nord-Pol Brigade, several means were employed to disseminate the scope, intent and particulars of the campaign to include the use of a press conference. The supporting Dutch-Bulgarian Engineering Battalion held a press conference on their base in Babanovac to announce the plan (known as the Weapons Hand-Over Program or "WHOP"). The news was picked up by the local press and subsequently published in the Bosnian national daily newspaper *Oslobodjenje* (*Liberation*).⁵ The campaign was reiterated at a follow-on press conference in Doboï, held by the Brigade's Press Information Officer.


To reinforce the campaign first announced through a press conference, the Nord-Pol Brigade also requested support from the Division PSYOP support element to

prepare tri-fold handbills. The Division PSYOP support element submitted the request through the product-approval process to the CJICTF at SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo. The approved product was disseminated through unit "social patrols" (regular unit patrols which essentially performed the same mission of U.S. Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs)) and other means to the local populace to explain the details of the program.

The campaign was also explained over unit-level radio shows in the Nord-Pol Brigade area of operations (AO) over civilian-owned radio stations, which provided periodic free air-time to broadcast the SFOR radio shows as a public-service and as an additional source of public information. One show in particular, broadcast over *Radio Dzungla*, featured both the Brigade PIO and an Explosives and Ordnance Demolitions (EOD) expert on the show to answer listener call-in questions about both the procedures of the program, and particulars about the kinds of explosives and munitions likely to be found in the area. In addition to soliciting call-in questions from the listening audience, the PIO suggested some lines of questioning for the radio show hostess to address possible concerns from the citizenry about any reservations they might have about the program as a way to highlight its positive aspects. One issue brought out in this manner was the fact that SFOR offered amnesty and anonymity for any persons participating.



Nord-Pol Interpreter, PIO, and EOD expert at a Radio Show at *Radio Dzungla*, 16 December 1998.



Through the JMC, the Nord-Pol Brigade secured the cooperation of the Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) to support the program. One feature of the program was that munitions turned in to the EAFs could be added to their authorized levels of munitions held in the Weapons Storage Sites (WSSs). The EAFs understood the scope, procedures, purpose, and intent of the program from the beginning. The JMC, therefore, represented a "low-tech" INFOSYS which expanded the dissemination of the program to the military, and subsequently to the populace. Commanders also explained the program through the use of meetings coordinated with local civil and police authorities and in their routine meetings with local officials, taking advantage of this INFOSYS, to reinforce the overall campaign.⁶ The Bde simultaneously used the INFOSYS represented by the routine meetings with local Police and Civil Authorities to disseminate messages on the UXO campaign.

Lesson Learned: *The Nord-Pol Brigade used all of the INFOSYSs available to support its IO supporting the UXO and weapons hand-over program. The Bde launched the campaign as a media event via the press conference, then followed up on radio via unit-level radio shows, and exploited the low-tech INFOSYS represented by the JMCs with the EAFs and the routine meetings with civilian leadership and police. The Bde's coordinated use of all available INFOSYSs and media represents an excellent example of a coordinated multi-media IO Campaign in support of operations.*

The Nord-Pol Bde's use of several media and INFOSYS highlights the IO planning principle of redundancy in Field Manual 100-6, Appendix C, "Planning Considerations," which states "planners provide diverse paths over multiple means to ensure timely, reliable information flow."⁷ Additionally, the observation serves as an illustrative historical vignette on how one unit developed its strategy to implement an IO Campaign.

Refining IO messages to match policies of national military contingents.

The TFE IOWG found that in Peace Operations, the constraints imposed on participating military contingents by their national governments required flexible application of civil-military programs in each area of responsibility (AOR). Accordingly, the supporting information operations must be tailored to each national contingent AOR. Planning operations in Multinational Peace Operations is often complicated as "national interests and organizational influence may compete with doctrine and efficiency...Consensus is painstakingly difficult, and solutions are often national in character... Commanders can expect contributing nations to adhere to national policies, which at times complicate the multinational effort."⁸ The constraints imposed on the national military contingents by domestic law or policy may result in any one operation being modified for each national contingent sector of operations to conform to nationally-imposed restrictions. This was the case in Operation JOINT FORGE for U.S. Forces concerning efforts to collect up UXO and weapons from the local populace. Legal, and or force protection restrictions often limited what U.S. Forces were permitted to do in Civil-Military programs during the NATO-led peace operations in the former Yugoslavia. As MND-N developed its annual operational campaign to "harvest" these UXO and weapons, it found that the execution would vary by national contingent based on such restrictions dictated by national laws and policy, and so separate information messages and products had to be developed for each national contingent AOR.

A year after the Operation HARVEST program was first launched, large seizures and discoveries of UXO and weapons caches were still taking place. Some discoveries of munitions were measured in tons. The Nord-Pol Bde determined that it would have to further reduce obstacles to the program to achieve real success. The Nord-Pol Bde decided to actively participate in the collection of UXO and weapons from the local populace and identified the potential disincentives to participation, and the policies and IO messages to counteract those disincentives. The national contingents of the Nord-Pol Bde which directly participated in the program went directly to reported sites to collect UXO and weapons for turn-in.



At that time, American forces had not yet received permission to accept UXO and munitions in such a manner. This resulted in having different messages and products for the Nord-Pol Sector and the American Sector. Messages in the Nord-Pol Bde directed the local populace to call for assistance by "Notifying either SFOR or Entity Armed Forces by telephone, alerting a patrol, or visiting any SFOR camp," and provided telephone numbers to the interpreters at each Nord-Pol base camp.⁹ Messages developed for the program in the American Sector would direct the local populace to contact local authorities to take possession of the UXO and weapons, with American SFOR soldiers providing only a monitoring function.

A major concern for the Americans was the legal aspects of the operation. As the Dayton Peace Accord made all military weapons in non-military possession illegal, any person possessing such weapons or any long-barreled weapon in the Zone of Separation was in violation of the law and could be prosecuted. While SFOR could promise that it would maintain anonymity for those participating, that is, not turn in anyone to civil or military authorities, it could not guarantee that these elements would not attempt to prosecute if anonymity was compromised. This legal aspect caused American Forces to delay their implementation of the program, until such time as the National legislatures could pass laws granting specific amnesty to citizens participating in the turn-in program. The legal aspect represents a policy consideration driving military operations.


Lesson Learned: *In developing a supporting IO campaign to complement civil-military operations, IO planners must tailor the IO messages and products to reflect the concept of operations developed by each national military contingent force in accordance with their domestic laws and policies. This will result in "packages" of IO messages and products that are different from one national military contingent sector to the next.*

Planning Considerations for PSYOP Product Dissemination in Multinational Peace Operations.

In a multinational operation, dissemination of PSYOP products may vary from one national military contingent to the next, depending on how that nation views the political situation or the PSYOP message or medium. PSYOP products print, television, and radio products are characterized by centralized product approval and production and decentralized dissemination by the subordinate maneuver units. During the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia, the CJICTF managed the PSYOP product approval and production process for IFOR and SFOR. The products generated had the sanction of the highest political body of NATO, the North Atlantic Council, or NAC. However, while approved for dissemination at the level of SFOR Headquarters, the actual dissemination of these products was the responsibility of the Multinational Divisions in the SFOR AOR.

During Operation JOINT GUARD, one of the consistent and frustrating factors in the PSYOP campaign was the inconsistency with which allied units disseminated the products. American PSYOP officers observed that the SFOR Commander (COMSFOR)'s subordinate commanders sometimes chose to ignore the strategic PSYOP messages if they did not have a voice in their production, did not agree with the message, did not like the product, or perceived that the message may not have relevance in his sector.¹⁰ Some national military contingents criticized PSYOP products generated by the CJICTF as not taking into account the local population's knowledge or sensitivities and being, perhaps, too Americanized.

"For example, SFOR developed several products on the role of the military, the police, and the media in a democracy. These products used quotes from Western historic figures (for example, Lincoln, Roosevelt, Clausewitz, or Clemenceau), which some did not believe appropriate for Bosnia-Herzegovina. These products did not appeal to the Bosnian's culture or history, nor did they dwell on recent examples of national reconciliation or mediation (such as El Salvador or South Africa). This limited the PSYOP products' relevance to their target audiences."¹¹




One of the lessons learned on PSYOP in peace operations is that "PSYOP campaigns should not shy away from tackling difficult issues, even if initial messages might have to obliquely or delicately handle such controversial issues."¹² However, in some MND sectors during OJG, some PSYOP products were deemed unpopular or too controversial and not disseminated, e.g., *Herald of Progress*, No. 24, which featured front-page photos of Karadzic and Mladic. At the time, in the RS, a power struggle was underway for national leadership. HQ SFOR intended to demonstrate support for the Banja Luka faction of the RS leadership, while demonstrating a firmer line against so-called Pale Serbs.¹³ Both Karadzic and Mladic were persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs) and wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (also known as "war crimes tribunal"). "MND-SW refused to disseminate it because they feared problems would occur in their area of the RS. In MND-N, the opposite often occurred."¹⁴ Occasionally, the French demurred on disseminating CJICTF-approved PSYOP products, but were generally supportive of the bland and inoffensive *Herald of Peace* and voter education products.¹⁵

During Operation JOINT FORGE, these same problems that had beset SFOR-level PSYOP dissemination efforts were found to exist among the national military contingents of MND-N as well, albeit to a significantly lesser degree. In one of the multinational brigades of MND-N, boxes of undelivered PSYOP products sat gathering dust in the Press Information Office, long after they should have been disseminated. This happened because they did not sit well with the political and media tastes of the national military contingent units of the brigade, and because the PIO staff assessed that these products would not be effective. At one meeting of the IOWG, the LOs of another national military contingent comprising its own brigade asked that they not receive any more PSYOP products printed in the Cyrillic alphabet, because "nobody wanted them." The DPDD had been provided products in both languages based on the ethnic composition of the brigade's AOR. The Cyrillic publications were intended for the Serb population. The LO's comments indicated that his unit's troops were not targeting the distribution of the products as they should have, and perhaps some of the target audience was being missed.

Lesson Learned: *One recurring theme of IO in a multinational operation is the difficulty of consistency.¹⁶ This is neither good nor bad, merely the way things are. In many cases, the national military contingents provide new ideas, or can do things U.S. forces can't do because they are not bound by U.S. laws or practices. In planning, the IO Cell must be aware that delivering the product to the unit headquarters does not necessarily guarantee that the product is disseminated "on the street." Only by speaking openly with the LOs representing the national military contingents about how the PSYOP products are received both at the unit, and on the street, will the right feedback go to the product development cell. It is better to know that a national military contingent will not or has not disseminated a particular PSYOP product, than to think the mission has been accomplished and the message has been delivered.*

PSYOP doctrine does not discuss this issue other than to say that in peace operations, PSYOP should "develop, coordinate, and conduct allied points of contact between all parties involved."¹⁷ The problem of inconsistent dissemination of PSYOP products based on the views and preferences of allied or coalition national military contingents is an appropriate planning consideration for future peace operations, the majority of which have been multinational in character.¹⁸

FM 100-6, Information Operations (August 1996), does not address the complexities of multi-national IO planning in peace operations. The two paragraphs in the "Joint and Multinational Planning" section in Appendix C, "Planning Considerations," note that the key to success is to "plan in a multi-national manner,"¹⁹ but lack details. This observations highlights some real-world multinational planning difficulties in developing IO products and messages in support of civil-military operations.☛



Endnotes, Chapter Four:

¹ Cognitions may be sensory or factual inputs to one's values or belief systems. In this case, cognitions in the context of the unique cultural and media environment of the national military contingent affect their values and beliefs on how media operate, and what styles are most appealing. See Daniel S. Papp, "**The Perceptual Framework**," in *Contemporary Interpersonal Relations: A Framework for Understanding* (Macmillan College Publishing Company, as reprinted in the U.S. Air Force Command and Staff College Strategic Environment Course 502, "Pitfalls of Strategic Analysis," ACSC Distance Learning Multimedia Edition, Version 2.1, June 1998).

² For a discussion of the TTPs established for Radio Shows in the American sector during OJF, see CALLCOMS observation 10000-05184, "**TTPs for the Preparation and Execution of the Commander's Radio Shows in OJF**."

³ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 August 1996, hereafter cited as **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**), p. C-3.

⁴ For a detailed description of the IOWG planning process, see CALLCOMS Observation No. 10001-00521, "**Information Operations Working Group Contingency Planning Process**," *Combined Arms Assessment Team 9, Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations*, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, March 1998, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, hereafter cited as *B/H CAAT 9 Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations*), p. A-49.

⁵ See *Tuzla Night Owl*, Vol. 3, No. 335, "**New Operation HARVEST**" (1 December 1998), p. 11.

⁶ These meetings with other than EAF representatives are often incorrectly referred to as "Bi-lats," short bi-lateral meeting, which applies only to meetings between SFOR and the EAFs.

⁷ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. C-1.

⁸ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *The Army in Multinational Operations, Field Manual 100-8* (Washington DC: USGPO, 24 November 1997), p. I-1.

⁹ Handbill produced by the SFOR CJICTF, Sarajevo, for the Nord-Pol Operation HARVEST, "SFOR and Entity Armed Forces Open Weapons Hand-Over Program."


¹⁰ *B/H CAAT 9 Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations*, p. 39.

¹¹ Pascale Combelles Siegel, *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations*, (Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1998), pp. 95-96.

¹² See Land Information Warfare Activity, *Student Materials: Introduction to Information Campaign Planning and Execution*, (Vienna Va.; SYTEX Inc., May 1998), Section 4.

¹³ The U.S. strategic information policy in BiH demonized Karadzic and Mladic using PSYOP. This intent was followed even after PSYOP polling analysis indicated these two men were considered the "George Washington" and "Thomas Jefferson" of Serbia. The potential vulnerabilities posed by such an approach were not properly perceived by NATO and U.S. decisionmakers. While PSYOP leaders and planners explained that such a campaign might only strengthen internal Serb unity and alienate them for NATO and the UN, the attempt to influence public opinion on these controversial characters was launched. The effectiveness of this approach has been widely and harshly criticized and the Department of State curtailed elements of its supporting public diplomacy campaign in the light of these difficulties.

¹⁴ Wentz, Larry K., "**Peace Operations and the Implications for Coalition Information Operations: The IFOR Experience**," working draft as of 18 February 1998, Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC, in press), pp. 27-28.




¹⁵ Ibid. Some national contingents may have political sensitivities to the use of the term "psychological operations." The French, for example, are reluctant because of political and historical reasons associated with psychological warfare as it was practiced in the Algerian conflict in 1961. Also, by national law, the Germans and Dutch cannot use the term psychological warfare.

¹⁶ See CALLCOMS Observation No. 10000-71410, "**National Military Contingents Conduct Information Operations with Unique Styles.**"

¹⁷ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1* (Washington, DC: USGPO, Unclassified, Distribution Limited), 18 February 1993, p. B-2.

¹⁸ While current PSYOP doctrine does not discuss coalition operations in detail, the next revision of FM 33-1 will. However, the model of efficient coalition PSYOP is probably from the Korean War. This model does not fully apply to peace operations scenarios such as that found in the former Yugoslavia.

¹⁹ **Field Manual 100-6, *Information Operations***, p. C-3.



Chapter Five

Civil Affairs and Public Affairs Support to IO

Civil Affairs (CA)

Much has transpired in the Army Civil Affairs arenas during the past few years, particularly in the area of IO. Civil Affairs is a significant player in IO and its doctrine should be revised to recognize that role. Additionally, the civil affairs primary role in peacekeeping operations should be reflected in its doctrinal manual. Currently, in FM 41-10, there are three references, comprising less than a page of text, that specifically address the CA role in peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, **FM 100-6, *Information Operations***, discusses civil affairs integration in great detail.


Civil Affairs is one of the three operations that the Army uses to gain and maintain information dominance. It has an integral role in any IO campaign. Army IO doctrine states that Civil Affairs and Public Affairs are interrelated operations that are conducted to support the Army objective of achieving information dominance in any operational environment across the range of military operations.

In peace operations, CA assists the military force in anticipating, facilitating, coordinating, and orchestrating those civil-military functions and activities pertaining to the civilian population, government, and economy in the AO where the activities of the military force and the collection of supporting International Organizations (IOs), NGOs, and PVOs overlap.¹ Civil Affairs personnel ensure that the civil-military functions undertaken are linked to the operational objectives of the military force.² CA serve as the link between the Peace Operations Force and the Humanitarian IOs and NGOs operating in the AO. Additionally, CA are the link between the peace operations force (the military instrument of power), and the U.S. Agency for Internal Development (USAID) and the international aid organizations (the economic elements of power).

Civil Affairs doctrine states that during peace operations, CA activities include "liaison with local authorities, representatives of IOs, and U.S. agencies."³ IO doctrine recognizes the value of these routine contacts as opportunities for both offensive and defensive IO – "CA is important to gain information dominance because of its ability to interface with key organizations and individuals in the GIE."⁴ The routine meetings conducted by Civil Affairs (CA) Direct Support Teams (DSTs), also referred to as tactical support teams or DSTs comprise a "low-tech" INFOSYS (information system) that support dissemination of IO messages.

The concept of the low-tech INFOSYS includes both the co-opting of existing forums of former warring faction (FWF) political, police, and military decisionmakers and the establishment of new links between the peace operations force and these FWF authorities, IOs and diplomatic elements.⁵ The routine meetings between and among the IOs and their FWF counterpart organizations and FWF governmental, political, social and military leaders represent a low-tech INFOSYS which influences FWF decisionmaking. These routine meetings may be co-opted as necessary to provide the peace operations force with necessary information or be used as an IO platform from which to disseminate IO messages. Other examples of low-tech INFOSYS include the routine visits with civilian and police authorities and the regular forums established between the peace operations force and the IOs operating in the area of operations.

In one American Battalion Task during Operation JOINT FORGE, the TF S-5, the senior CA officer in the TF, developed an SOP that capitalized on the IO aspects of all TF CA missions. The S-5 reviewed the planned CA operations and provided the team with the IO messages to be reinforced with the local officials during operations. By comparing the day's planned activities to the published IO messages, the CA operations officer was able to identify those messages that fit best with the mission activities, aligning message and audience accordingly.



Civil Affairs Routine Meeting with Kalesija Fire Department and public Safety Chiefs provides an example of the opportunities CA DSTs have to disseminate IO messages to key local leaders.

DSTs operating out of Camp Dobol in the American Sector during Operation JOINT FORGE conducted routine meetings with the civil authorities in its AO. On 24 December 1998, one of these meetings was with the Chief of Public Safety and the Chief of the City Fire Department of the city of Kalesija in the Bosnian-Croat Federation. On this meeting, the DST NCO brought with him a Subject Matter Expert on fire fighting, a representative from the Camp Dobol fire fighting crew. The purpose of the meeting was twofold, to conduct an "area assessment" of the town's capabilities, and to

strengthen communications between the civil authorities and the peace operations force. "Civil Affairs establishes relations among military forces, the public and civil authorities to exchange information, build understanding and gain information that may be critical to decisionmaking."⁶ By establishing or strengthening avenues of communication with civilian leaders and decisionmakers, CA units allow the Commander to reach out beyond the INFOSYS of the Military Information Environment by expanding the INFOSYS available to the commander.

During the meeting, the CA DST NCO and the Camp Dobol firefighter inquired about opportunities for fire prevention programs to the local schools to complement the on-going mine awareness and UXO programs already undertaken. Having a Subject Matter Expert with him improved the NCO's credibility and demonstrated attention to the concerns of the local officials, thus facilitating better two-way communication. Such communication channels require maintenance and attention so that they will be available and responsive during times of crisis, to reach decisionmakers in the civil authorities and to influence the greater public. Addressing local concerns ensures proper focus on the principle of *legitimacy* in peace operations, which seeks to sustain support in the local populace and among the former warring faction (FWF) leadership for the peace operations force and the peace settlement.⁷

"CA elements perform an important connection and liaison with key actors and influencers in the GIE. CA specialists help the commander shape his MIE and assist him in dealing effectively with NGOs, PVOs, and civil authorities."⁸

--FM 100-6, *Information Operations*



Lesson Learned: *IO doctrine recognizes that CA specialists help the commander shape his military information environment. The routine meetings with civil authorities represent both an opportunity for CA to collect information for the commander as well as an opportunity to disseminate selected messages to key leaders and decisionmakers among the FWFs. The meeting between the CA DST NCO and the Chiefs of the Kalesija Departments of Fire and Public Safety is representative of the unique opportunities that CA has to disseminate IO messages to key leaders in the local community during peace operations. The meeting also represents a low-tech INFOSYS that served as a platform from which to disseminate IO messages at key civilian leaders and decisionmakers, as well as to collect RII.*

Command and control of Civil Affairs Direct Support Teams (DSTs).

In TFE CA Direct Support Teams were operationally controlled down to the supported Battalion Task Force. However, a parallel CA chain of command and reporting channel was also apparent. This is not unusual; many organizations (e.g., PSYOP, Public Affairs) that function in relatively small units in a Battalion Task Force sector operate within a dual chain of command arrangement. In fact, FM 41-10 states that one of the G5's primary duties is to *exercise staff supervision over CA units attached or under the operational control of the command and over CA activities in the command.* With the emergence of IO as a main effort in Operation JOINT FORGE, however, centralized planning of CA operations served to illustrate that the parallel chain of command could potentially pose a problem for the DSTs. On one hand, the IO cell would provide definitive guidance on specific themes and messages to be emphasized IAW the commander's guidance. On the other hand, the Bn TF Commander may determine that a different theme or some messages are appropriate given the current situation in his sector. While these scenarios never posed a significant problem for the DSTs, conflicting guidance that must be resolved prior to execution does take time and coordination that would otherwise not be required. The command of CA units and control of CA operations require a clear, definitive CA structure...the mission, scope of operation, security considerations, signal capabilities, and degree of CA authority granted to military commanders are a few of the factors when establishing command relationships.⁹ Where a parallel chain-of-command relationship exists, such as in the CA units, the G5 must exercise caution to minimize the potential of issuing conflicting guidance.

Lesson Learned: *CA command and control relationships should be clearly defined. During peacekeeping operations where IO may assume a prominent role, it is particularly important to avoid assigning missions, themes and messages outside of the G3-S3 channels. The Information Operations Working Group (IOWG), through the biweekly meetings which included representatives from the G3 and G5 sections, ensured that conflicting taskings were not an issue for Task Force Eagle.*

Civil Affairs representation in Information Operations planning.

In peacekeeping operations, CA units are often the single, most-important linkage between the command and the population the command is attempting to reach. IAW FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, CA units can assess the needs of civil authorities, act as an interface between civil authorities and the military supporting agency and as liaison to the civilian populace, develop population and resource control measures, and coordinate with international support agencies. In Operation JOINT FORGE, CA units were extensively involved in all the above tasks. This involvement necessitated an aggressive CA role in the IOWGs.



First, a qualified CA representative who is thoroughly knowledgeable about the capabilities and limitations of the units in the organization will streamline the planning process. Time spent discussing basic organizational capabilities will be better spent on actual operational planning. Further, because the vast majority of CA personnel are from the Reserves, the CA representative may also be aware of any particular strengths and weaknesses of the CA units in the AOR. For example, one of the direct support teams (DSTs) may include as a member a civil engineer who may be ideally suited to assist in the application of programs such as the Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program (CIRP).

Additionally, the CA representative should be completely familiar with the detailed intelligence reported through CIMIC daily reports and, as such, will be an invaluable source of information as future operations are being planned. The CA representative should be knowledgeable on, and able to provide information regarding, the effectiveness of current programs. As future operations are being planned, it is important for all members of the IOWG to understand how past and ongoing programs are being received. The CA representative, in the case of TFE, the G5 Plans Officer, will be also be well versed in any current intelligence that may prove useful to the IOWG as a whole.

In some instances, the CA representative may even take the lead role in IO planning. During Operation JOINT FORGE, one of the Division's primary tasks was to set the conditions for the return of Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPREs). In assembling the campaign plan for this mission, the IO cell designated the G5 as the lead agency. This was undoubtedly because of the extensive interaction and relationships of the CA units with the wide variety of IOs, Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in the return of the displaced persons.

Lesson Learned: *Units who ensure active CA representation in IO planning will develop and execute more effective IO campaigns. Consistency of message and use of all available INFOSYS will break down stovepipes and cause synergy and unity of effort.*

CA reporting procedures in Task Force Eagle during Operation JOINT FORGE.

TFE standardized and refined CA reporting procedures to ensure more detailed, accurate and timely reporting of information from all subordinate CA elements. Prior to the development and adoption of a CA report matrix, reporting relevant information and intelligence obtained by the CA Direct Support Teams was accomplished through a variety of reports. Clearly, the information gathered by the DSTs is invaluable in the context of the overall IO campaign plan. It should be immediately accessible to all members of the division staff, the IOWG members and the Combined Joint Information Operations Task Force (CJICTF). Previously, daily situation reports were submitted by the Brigade S5s in a number of different formats, which included:

- Daily CIMIC Report
- OPTEMPO Report
- Monthly CIMIC Report
- IO Report
- Contact List
- Other Reports as Required
- Requests for Information



The new reporting matrix combined all the above reports into a single format, which is required to be submitted daily. Further, the matrix allows the reader to rapidly peruse the report and it attempts to tie specific actions to approved themes and messages. This may be the most beneficial result. By linking the result of the contact with an approved IO theme, the matrix provides immediate feedback on the success or failure of any number of contributing players. If, for example, a previous PSYOP mission was designed to convince a local leader to support the return of displaced persons, a CA team might well get an indication if that operation was successful during a discussion on an unrelated subject.

Additionally, the development of the Excel spreadsheet report allows faster compilation of reports and ensures faster transmission to SFOR as well as other members of the TFE staff. Finally, the data base created by the TFE G5 will enable rapid searches for information. If historical information is required on a particular individual, for example, a simple query will provide all references to that individual for the selected period. The same is true for references to a given location or topic of discussion. The utility of such a data base cannot be overstated.

The new Comprehensive CIMIC Reporting System provides the following information:

DATE: Date the event occurred.

TIME: Time the event occurred.

BDE: Which Bde sector contact was made (NordPol, Turkish, Russian, U.S.).

TASK FORCE: Which Battalion Task Force made the contact.

MISSION: Brief description of what the CA element was doing (e.g.: made contact with local police chief).

LOCATION: Community or location of contact.

GRID: Four-digit grid zone of the contact.

NARRATIVE: What actually occurred in terms of Who, What, Where, When and Why (e.g.: met with Police Chief Slobodon Blocovic. Chief Blocovic stated that the situation is stable in his community. However, he cited an increase in petty theft in Homevici, which he attributes to certain ethnic groups. CIMIC Team Chief cited the need to cooperate for a better future for Bosnia, and he grudgingly agreed. When asked what he would like from SFOR he stated that "additional MND-N patrols in the community would help him keep theft down and help him support GFAP.").

ANALYSIS: The "So What" question. How this mission affects the overall objective (e.g.: Police Chief Blocovic holds influence over the community. He also exercises absolute control over his force of 12 police officers. He can prevent or permit the return of displaced persons and refugees (DPREs) to his community. He is friendly toward SFOR, but voices a certain pro-ethnic rhetoric. He is not an obstacle to RETURNS but he will not actively support this process. Team interprets Blocovic's request for additional patrols as lip service, as additional patrols would diminish his authority.).



NEXT ACTION: What action, if any, is scheduled to follow this event (e.g.: Another meeting scheduled in one week. Will validate intent for additional patrols and request from Task Force Commanders as appropriate.).

IO THEMES SUPPORTED: Completed by inserting codes assigned to specific themes (e.g.: T17, T18) as identified in the IO chart.

IO INTENT: What IO tools are being used during the contact (e.g.: influence, observe, etc.).

IO OUTCOME: What was the outcome of the contact (e.g.: IO message delivered but accepted grudgingly.).

SFOR CATEGORY: How SFOR categorizes CA actions:

- | | |
|--|---|
| ● Rule of Law and Common Institutions | ● Democratization |
| ● Synchronization of the Civil-Military Effort | ● Public Security |
| ● Economy and Infrastructure | ● BRCKO (town in the RS, which was the subject of an intense arbitration process) |
| ● Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPREs) | ● Other Information |

PARTICIPANT 1: Identify the personnel contacted or participating in the contact (e.g.: Police Chief Slobodon Blocovic).

PARTICIPANT 1 TITLE: Use full title (e.g.: Police Chief).

PARTICIPANT 1 DETAILS: Insert all relevant information.

OTHER PARTICIPANTS: Identify all other primary players in the same manner as participant.

Lesson Learned: *Relevant Information and Intelligence (RII) gathered by the CA teams may have wide-ranging applicability in the IO campaign and can benefit many other key players, in particular, members of the IOWG. A timely, accurate method of distributing this information is essential to capitalize on this information. TFE developed a tool that not only simplified reporting requirements but also ensured that RII was rapidly disseminated.*

CA units reinforce Task Force Eagle themes and messages.

As a key player in the IO campaign, CA units reinforce themes and messages in their routine meetings with local officials. Themes and messages are refined in the IOWG and provided to the G3 who disseminates them to subordinate units through FRAGOs. The G5 additionally provides the approved themes and messages through the Bde S5s down to the Battalion S5s. The Battalion S5s then incorporate the themes and messages into the CA OPTEMPO plan. The OPTEMPO is a matrix that allows the S5 to project DST activities for a two-week period.



The S5 attempts to identify the appropriate contact events for the DSTs to reinforce the approved themes and messages. For example, if a particular DST has a meeting scheduled with the local Police Chief, the S5 will link a specific theme and the associated messages that would be appropriate for that contact. The theme may be one that stresses professionalism and civil responsibility or it could be the importance of the rule of law in establishing peace and prosperity for all. An associated message may be one that highlights the need for acceptance of ethnic differences, which supports community development and stability.

The Battalion S5's challenge is to link the theme and message to specific individuals or groups. The DST's challenge, on the other hand, is to skillfully integrate these themes and messages into their dialogue with these groups or individuals to ensure that they are received and understood.

Following these meetings, it is imperative that the DSTs provide feedback through the CA channels and the operational chain of command as to the perceived effectiveness of the message. Just because they were able to get the message out does not mean that it was received as intended. Responses to these messages must be captured and sent back up the chain to assist the IO planners in determining effectiveness of the overall campaign. There may be distinct linkages between different elements of the Task Force that may not be readily apparent to subordinate elements. The IOWG is uniquely postured to ensure that RII is shared with all appropriate elements.

Lesson Learned: *CA units are one of the primary means of delivering themes and messages to the local population through their daily activities. While themes and messages may be developed and approved several headquarters higher, it is the responsibility of the CA elements who are routinely interfacing with the local officials to deliver these messages and provide feedback as to their effectiveness.*


Civil Affairs role in the Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program (CIRP).

In support of the overall IO campaign, CA Tactical Support Teams play an active role in determining the requirements for, identification, submission, and the verification of, CIRP projects. The CIRP initiative is a powerful tool for obtaining cooperation from the local populace. In heavily damaged areas or war-neglected areas, funding for rebuilding community infrastructure can help restore normalcy and promote minority returns through the re-establishment of services, such as clean water, electricity, street lighting, roads, bridges, and a host of other services. As a tool in the IO campaign, the CIRP can be an extremely effective instrument in shaping public opinion through correct application of resources in the local community. These programs constitute a pressure point, that is, it is something that could be influenced to affect the behaviors of the target audience.

Essentially, planners can use the CIRP to reward compliance and promote minority returns through targeted allocation of CIRP funding. Initially, CA teams can be useful as an intermediary in helping to spread the word that CIRP projects are available, identifying them, and explaining what the conditions are for receiving them. In other words, "if you support the resettlement of displaced persons we can get the electricity running again."

Once CIRP projects are approved and completed, there is a requirement to ensure that they are being used as intended. The three essential questions that the DSTs attempt to answer as they conduct routine follow-up inspections are as follows:

- ☛ Is it (the project) being used as intended?
- ☛ Are the people who are supposed to benefit from the project actually benefiting from it?
- ☛ Is it being maintained properly?



DSTs attempt to answer these questions through regularly scheduled site visits. During these visits, they observe the physical condition of the projects as well as solicit input from local civilians who are the intended benefactors. In most cases, it should be fairly easy to answer the questions. If, for example, an elementary school was rebuilt, then it will be readily apparent if it is being wrongly used as a store or apartment building. The same would apply to the community use of a well.

Lesson Learned: *CA units are ideally suited and positioned to assist in determining the requirements for CIRP projects, identifying projects, assisting in the submission process and verifying that projects are being maintained and used for their intended purpose. CA units maintain awareness on the needs of the populace and can recommend appropriate economic pressure points for IO problem sets.*

Public Affairs (PA)


The Public Affairs Weekly Commander's Themes and Messages Report

During OJF, Public Affairs supported IO execution with the *Weekly Commander's Themes and Messages* report. It was a valuable "playbook" for supporting C²-Attack operations throughout the force that ensured all spoke with one voice in accordance with the commander's intent for IO. The senior public affairs officer in Task Force Eagle was also the director of the Coalition Press Information Center (formerly the Joint Information Bureau). The CPIC Director issued the *Weekly Commander's Themes and Messages* report to all base camps in the division AOR. Its primary purpose was to assist commanders in dealing with the media. The weekly report included information from "the interagency," SFOR public information offices, speeches and press briefing transcripts.

An important component to this report was the section dedicated to "IO Themes and Messages." The PA supported the IOWG in developing these themes and messages in response to specific IO "problem sets." Joint Doctrine directs PA to develop PA plans in support of operations and to anticipate and pre-plan responses.¹⁰ The purpose of these themes was to have talking points available for commanders and staff officers to conduct discussions with local leaders and citizens.

The IO themes were reviewed weekly, and changes were published in the report. The report contained all messages disseminated through weekly FRAGOs from the IO Cell, and those developed for the commander by PA. Through the IOWG meetings, the CPIC Director and other PA representatives to the IOWG could draft messages intended to achieve the desired behaviors from the targeted audiences. The Commanding General approved the themes and messages prior to their dissemination to the force. This ensured that the entire force spoke with one voice, regardless of the forum or audience. The goal of the weekly report was to develop appropriate messages for civil, military, and political leaders, as well as the general population. The report emphasized that the themes and messages were intended to be used whenever possible, urging commanders that "Regardless of question or forum, you should try to incorporate these themes into your responses."

In response to one particular problem set, the Brcko Arbitration Decision, the weekly report provided commanders seven basic themes that addressed the potential problems identified in IOWG wargaming. Supporting the themes were focused messages for the various audiences: civil authorities, leaders and public officials; Entity Armed Forces military leaders; business leaders; entity police forces, and the general population. There were 31 messages focused on civil authorities, leaders and public officials, 16 on EAF military leaders, 7 on business leaders, 12 on the entity police forces, and 32 on the general population. These messages were an IO tool for every



interaction between the peace operations force and the FWFs. The messages supported commanders' radio shows, media interviews, and meetings with local officials. The messages also supported CA DSTs conducting liaison with public officials. Every conceivable interaction between the peace operations force and the FWFs was an opportunity to disseminate an IO message.

PA support to IO in the form of the commander's themes and messages provides a means to communicate to targeted audiences and potential adversaries. It is an important element to ensuring that the resolve and intent of the peace operations force is clearly communicated and correctly interpreted by the adversary – his confusion or misunderstanding of the force's capabilities and intent may prolong the operation.¹¹


Public affairs doctrine recognizes the role of PA in supporting IO, and directs PA to support IO by coordinating with IO planners "to ensure consistent messages," and by "coordinating actions and synchronizing messages."¹² Current PA doctrine specifically mentions *Weekly Messages for Commanders* and how these messages were used in Operation JOINT GUARD down to company-level operations.¹³ By providing themes and messages approved by the commanding general, PA accomplishes both of these tasks. However, FM 100-6 does not specifically address the role of the PA in drafting command messages in support of synchronized IO. FM 100-6 merely states that the PA representative to the IO Cell "coordinates with CA and PSYOP representatives to ensure consistency of messages," in the "Coordination and Support" section which identifies the roles and tasks of the PA representative to the IO Cell.¹⁴ As stated, the emphasis is more on review rather than on taking the lead.

Lesson Learned: In developing the *Commander's Weekly Themes and Messages*, the Public Affairs representative to the IO Cell performs a key function. The report ensures the entire command will speak with one voice. The report was disseminated to all base camps, and, therefore, supported all operations that interacted with the FWFs. All the messages were approved by the commander, and were, therefore, in accordance with his intent. The report was timely – updated weekly, it reflected the commander's views on what the force would achieve through IO. The *Weekly Commander's Themes and Messages* report made PA one of the fastest, most all-inclusive means by which to disseminate IO messages to targeted audiences.


Public Affairs refutes hostile propaganda through Press Conference.

SFOR's Multinational Division – North (MND-(N)) used a regularly scheduled press conference on 27 November 1998 to defeat hostile propaganda published in the local press and directed against U.S. forces in Task Force Eagle.

On 11 November 1998, U.S. soldiers from Camp McGovern held a meeting in the town of Dizdarsa to inform the citizenry about Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE) re-settlement activities in their area. Bosnian Serbs, representing elements opposed to the peace operation force and the settlement, disrupted the meeting attended by about 40 Bosnians. Five individuals intruded into the meeting and threatened the Bosnian Muslims in attendance. One of the Bosnian Serbs even threatened to kill and eat a Bosniak returnee attending the meeting. The U.S. soldiers immediately took photographs of three of these intruders to document their illegal activities, but two Bosnian Serbs departed before the soldiers could photograph them. Upon determining the identities of the remaining perpetrators, a patrol from Camp McGovern went to their homes to deliver a message through an interpreter that "SFOR would not tolerate violence," and again photographed them.




Word of the event resulted in a *Stars and Stripes* news reporter covering the story by conducting an interview with the TF Commander. The *Stars and Stripes* story was a balanced and an accurate one that correctly portrayed as legal and appropriate the actions of the American soldiers in locating and warning the perpetrators against violent outbursts. The opening line of the article read "U.S. troops have come under literary fire in the local press that reported Stabilization Force soldiers harassed two Serbian men who voiced opposition to Muslim resettlement in the Brcko area."¹⁵ That comment alluded to the 17 November 1998 issue Bosnian Serb newspaper, *Gras Srpski*, which reported less-than-accurate information portraying the SFOR soldiers as abusing their power, stating that "Six armored cars of the American elite cavalry unit stationed at Brcko...surrounded the two houses and identified the persons by force."¹⁶



Press Conference, 27 November 1998. Example of a low-tech INFOSYS.

COMEAGLE directed his PAO to respond to the hostile propaganda and refute it. The method selected in this case was the press conference to the local media of the Brcko area. On 27 November 1998, the Director of the MND-N CPIC, the senior PAO in TFE, issued a statement at the weekly press conference held at OHR-N headquarters in Brcko. The statement refuted the claims of abuse of power and stated the facts for subsequent dissemination by the local media representatives in attendance. The statement reiterated that the soldiers "were performing their mission in accordance with the Dayton Accords," (and, therefore, acting within their authority), and that the soldiers accomplished their mission "...without physical altercation with any of the individuals...the patrols vehicles remained parked on the street (and) no houses or dwellings were surrounded by either SFOR soldiers or vehicles at any time."¹⁷



After the press conference, the CPIC Director provided the statement to the McGovern PSYOP element to broadcast the statement in Serbo-Croatian over *Radio Mir*, a PSYOP-operated FM radio station targeted at the Brcko area audience. By presenting the statement at the Press Conference, the PA officer reported it as a news event. The local media took the news and re-broadcast the message. Reinforcing that, the PSYOP-controlled radio station also broadcast the message to its listening public. Army IO doctrine for PA assigns it the role of "conducting counter-propaganda and protection for misfortune/rumor."¹⁸ TFE's use of a public statement, issued through the INFOSYS represented by the Press Conference, and subsequently following up that statement through broadcasting over PSYOP radio, represents doctrine in application.

Lesson Learned: *The use of an established information system, or INFOSYS, as that represented by the monthly MND-N Press Conference to refute propaganda is a vivid demonstration of Public Affairs C²-Protect Operations. In this case, the most rapid response available to defeat the hostile propaganda was PA and the appropriate means through which to do it was the press conference. That this same message was then released through PSYOP radio demonstrates how the various components of IO can be mutually reinforcing.*

Public Affairs Coordinates Inter-Agency Information Operations


The MND-N CPIC conducted joint press conferences and synchronized IO with the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) International Police Task Force (IPTF) Press and Information Officer (PIO).

During the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia, the senior division PA officer in MND-N was the CPIC Director and was responsible for executing the Commander's public information programs.¹⁹ The CPIC Director conducted weekly press conferences, alternating between Tuzla and Brcko, which were held in cooperation with the IPTF PIO.



The MND-N CPIC Director and UN IPTF Press and Information Officer confer at a Joint Press Conference, Tuzla, 9 January 1999.
(Photo by Carolyn Cerminara, *Stars and Stripes*)

The cooperation between the division's IO and the IPTF press and information activities took many forms. Regarding the press conferences, both spokespersons made sure they were "on the same sheet of music" beforehand. Before heading into the press conference chambers, the CPIC Director and IPTF PIO would meet to discuss issues and positions, anticipated questions and proper responses. The CPIC Director provided the messages the division commander wanted to disseminate to the entity police to the IPTF PIO. This reinforces lessons learned during OJE/OJG where external coordination for press and information efforts "benefited both the military and civilian organizations -- future commanders can capitalize on this success."²⁰ Additionally, the division contributed to the IPTF's ability to measure the effectiveness of its press and information activities by providing unclassified media analysis and open-source



intelligence (OSINT) reporting on local media by providing the daily *Tuzla Night Owl*. This allowed the IPTF spokesperson to monitor reporting on the IPTF and to keep abreast of issues concerning both SFOR and the IPTF with regards to entity police forces.

The IPTF PIO said that the cooperation between TFE and her office was valuable to a clearer and more consistent information campaign and provided unity of effort. Commenting on the nature of peace operations in general, the IPTF PIO spoke about her previous experiences in UN operations noting that with so many organizations on the ground contributing to the peace effort, "everyone was intruding into each other's areas and this did not present a united front." The results were conflicting messages and a confused audience. Describing the cooperative relationship between IPTF press and information and MND-N information operations, the IPTF PIO said, "We exchange information and we think of things we can do together." The IPTF PIO stressed that "We need to know what the other organizations (contributing to the peace effort) are doing – what their messages are. We can't afford to say 'I don't know' too many times."


Unity of Effort is a principle of peace operations and MOOTW. "In peace operations, achieving unity of effort is complicated by the numbers of nonmilitary organizational participants (including NGOs (such as the IPTF) and PVOs), the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. These factors require that commanders...rely heavily on consensus-building (cooperation) to achieve unity of effort."²¹ Army IO doctrine recognizes that NGOs and PVOs "contribute to IO" and "offer a variety of services and resources...this expanded field of individual and organizational *senders* and *receivers* of information, with varying methods of operation and focus," adds new avenues for conducting IO in a mutually reinforcing manner."²²

Lesson Learned: *The cooperation between the division PA and UN IPTF PIO leveraged the credibility and abilities of each to achieve even greater IO effects and served to achieve unity of effort in the information activities of the two independent organizations involved in the overall peace effort. The specific areas of cooperation were sharing of unclassified OSINT media analysis, sharing of unclassified IO themes and messages, and coordination and synchronization of press and information activities.*

IO doctrine makes the case for cooperation and with IOs and NGOs in the area of IO operations, and exploitation of information, they may provide to contribute to developing RII. This incidence of cooperation between PA and the IPTF is an illustrative example that provides details on how such cooperation and interaction "should look." Task Force Eagle's successful cooperation and synchronization of press and information activities with the United Nations IPTF in Operation JOINT FORGE should be used as an example of successful TTP in IO in a MOOTW environment.

Public Affairs Media Analysis Provides Critical Input for IO Planners

Media analysis centers on the effectiveness of the PA program in the western media and asks: Who is receiving PA products and information? What is the resulting reaction(s) or action(s) (i.e., did command messages come through?, what did articles or broadcasts say?). PAOs can create standardized methods for researching results from media products. PAOs must evaluate the efficacy of their effort by objective, and possibly subjective, methods by analyzing existing data. "Targeting information extends beyond the battlefield and involves more than attacking an adversary's information flow while protecting the friendly information flow. It also requires awareness of, and sensitivity to, information published by nonmilitary sources."²³ Media analysis provides the IO planner with a greater understanding of the operating environment.



PAOs must develop planning tools that sharply define their role in IO. This will establish the basis for standing operating procedures for PAOs and, just as importantly, it will establish definite expectations for PAO participation for other IO members. The list assembled below is a first attempt at creating a clearly delineated set of PAO functions in supporting IO through media analysis.

- **Continuously provide the IO staff with assessments of key U.S. and western media publication and broadcast products.**

- **Much of the function of evaluating *foreign* (nonwestern) media will come from intelligence and other sources.** However, PAOs should "understand the concepts of centers of gravity, calculated risk, initiative, security, and surprise."²⁴ In the GIE, this can include editors of major or regional newspapers, and news directors of radio and television stations. The PAO is not equipped or manned to collect such data. The role of the PAO can be to evaluate the (translated) data that relates to the media and provide a PA perspective to other IO staff members.


- **Assist deception planners to "identify any preconceptions that the adversary leadership may have about friendly intentions and capabilities."**²⁵ Evaluate editorials, commentary, and partisan publications if provided with translated materials from intelligence sources. Again, **PAOs are not intelligence analysts nor deception planners.** The PAO should review materials for comparison with western media output.

Public Affairs Media Analysis as a Battle Damage Assessment Tool in IO.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, the Information Operations Working Group suggested using the Public Affairs Weekly Media Analysis report as a means to provide feedback to the IO Cell as it conducted IO combat assessment of C²-Attack operations. **"Combat assessment and measures of effectiveness (MOE) assess the effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment uses precise objective information, while MOE quantify subjective information."**²⁶ Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) is both part of combat assessment and part of the IPB process, in terms of confirming or denying previous estimates and updating the IPB.²⁷ BDA uses precise objective information while MOE quantify subjective information. C²-Attack operations can be both "hard" and "soft" kill in effect.²⁸ "Hard kill" operations imply physical destruction with the application of lethal combat power, while "soft kill" operations achieve effects in attitudes and decisions. In peace operations, C²-Attack operations will primarily be "soft kill" operations.

The METL in FM 100-6 for the IO Cell includes establishing C²-Attack targeting and BDA.²⁹ IO in support of peace operations pose a unique challenge to the IO Cell in conducting BDA because the effects of C²W on the enemy C² may not be in the form of physical damage. Instead, the effects may well be trends, activities, and patterns in the future actions of adversaries, and key actors in the battlespace.³⁰ Subjective "measures of effectiveness" or MOE are developed to determine if the messages are having the desired effect, while BDA indicate the successful delivery of the message. TFE was challenged to develop MOE which could assess the effectiveness of IO in C²-Attack operations that emphasized persuasive messages.

The primary method used in Task Force Eagle (from IFOR to SFOR 4) to conduct BDA had been to monitor the effects of IO messages delivered through friendly force IO platforms, such as PSYOP radio shows, and printed products by tasking intelligence assets to collect human intelligence on how they were received by the target audiences. In fact, Joint doctrine lists counterintelligence and human resource intelligence (HUMINT) as sources of feedback on the effectiveness of IO in the form of PSYOP.³¹ Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) reported the reactions of people when receiving PSYOP products. These teams discussed with radio station managers the response of the listening audience to PSYOP "Mir-mix" tapes, commanders' radio shows, and PSYOP spots.



Not used as a MOE, but showing promise as an MOE tool was the Public Affairs' Weekly Media Analysis report. This report tracked the number of stories reported over local media on topics of interest to the peace operations force. Categories of stories reflected the areas of interest and problem sets under the scrutiny of the IO Cell. The media analysis report told the IO Cell what stories were getting the most press, which the least, and whether the majority of reporting was either positive, neutral, or negative. These categories were displayed on bar-charts for easy references and backed up with the actual numbers where appropriate.

For Information Campaigns focused on a particular problem set, the Media Analysis Report may be an effective way to determine which specific IO Messages and Themes are being recirculated in the media. For example, a commander's message put out at a press conference may be subsequently reported in several local media. Likewise, commander's messages developed by the IO Cell, or by the PA in coordination with IOWG, may be further reinforced by official statements by local authorities, and again circulated in the media. This latter example did indeed happen with a specific IO message disseminated to the civil political leadership during SFOR 4 in Operation JOINT FORGE. One of the IO messages disseminated to all base camps in both the IO FRAGO and the *Commander's Weekly Themes and Messages* report focusing on curtailing the local practice of "celebratory fire." that is, shooting weapons into the air. This message was reinforced by official pronouncements from the Bosnian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs. The original IO messages for each audience were:

Public Officials: Celebratory gunfire endangers the citizens you are responsible to protect.

General Public: Firing a gun into the air is dangerous. A bullet must come down somewhere and it may harm someone without you knowing it; most often, it's a small child who pays the price. Why endanger children with needless gunfire? Select other means of celebrating the season and have a safe and peaceful 1999. Your friends in SFOR wish you peace, prosperity and long life.


Local Police: Please help protect the citizens of your city. Celebratory gunfire endangers those citizens. A bullet must come down somewhere and it may harm an innocent person.

The message to Public Officials was reinforced in an announcement by the BH Federation Ministry of Affairs and was recirculated in the Bosnian national daily newspaper, *Oslobodjenje (Liberation)*, on 31 December 1998. The article in the paper read:

"The BH Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs issued an announcement, which states that BH citizens are called upon to refrain from any use of firearms and pyrotechnics (in the celebration of the New Year). The BH Federation MUP (Ministry of Police) warned that the use of arms, pyrotechnics, and explosive devices represents a serious violation of the law on public peace and will be treated as such."³²

The media analysis report could be used to track by IO theme or message set, such as the one described above, using the same methods already in use. Used as an MOE, the report would show how many stories were appearing in the local media which supported the aims of the IO campaign for that particular problem set.

Public Affairs doctrine labels the kind of media analysis discussed here as "Media Content Analysis," the focus of which is to "provide an evaluation of the *quantity*, and the *nature*, of (media) coverage, and reveal intended as well as unintended messages."³³ This is something that Public Affairs already does that can help solve the BDA dilemma. IO doctrine is almost exclusively focused on combat operations. Field Manual 100-6, August 1996, discusses BDAs, not in the context of a MOOTW environment.



Lesson Learned: *The use of the PA Weekly Media Analysis Report has not yet been tested, but represents a possible tool for measuring the effectiveness of IO themes and messages as they are recirculated in local media and by the leadership elements of the FWFs. IO doctrine does not presently include any techniques for BDAs on C²-Attack operations for a MOOTW environment. The only suggested indicator for BDAs is "absence of activity on a C² net, combined with an increase in (electronic communications) traffic elsewhere."³⁴ Neither does Public Affairs doctrine address the contributions that PA can make to BDAs. If this technique proves feasible, it could be used an example of BDA or MOE in MOOTW in future iterations of both doctrinal manuals.*


Commander's Internal Information Program as a C²-Protect Measure.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, the Commanding General of the first CONUS-based division to deploy to Bosnia used weekly video tele-conferences with the rear detachment and unit family readiness groups (FRGs) as part of an overall Internal Information program (formerly the command information program). The Commanding General used this medium to provide command information to families, and to quell rumors, misinformation, and potential disinformation at home station. These video teleconferences took place every Thursday evening at 2000 local. According to IO doctrine, the commander's internal information program is under the supervision of the Division PAO; however, in TFE, responsibility for managing the Video-Teleconference aspect of it was shared between the G-1 and the PAO with assistance from the G-6. During these video teleconferences, the Division Commander personally asked "what are the rumors back there?" and provided answers to the assembled FRG representatives, spouses, and local community representatives.

Unit commanders were scheduled to brief on different weeks, and these schedules were published to the FRGs for dissemination. In this way, the video teleconference room was rotated in time slots to accommodate and support the many battalions and smaller units in the forward-deployed division. Brigade, battalion, and even company commanders presented briefings with still images and Powerpoint slides to the home audience, explaining the mission and highlighting unit training and unit-sponsored programs implemented to take care of soldiers. One company commander stated that the video teleconferences were also a great communications tool for conducting business with the unit rear detachment.

Commanders use their internal information programs to communicate directly to soldiers, leaders and their families to explain the mission and their part in it. "Establishing an effective internal information program enhances the morale of soldiers, reinforces the stated unit mission, and supports accurate media reports for both soldiers and their families."³⁵ A lesson learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was that family support groups (FSGs) needed an information pipeline, which they did not have, for receiving command information from official sources.³⁶ The weekly video teleconference with the assembled staff and unit representatives provided a powerful medium to support the commander's internal information program and include the FRG/FSG.

IO doctrine recognizes the value of internal information programs in a C²-Protect role of countering "rumors and uncertainty" on both the front line and the home front.³⁷ The internal information program is more than a post newspaper or processing home-town news releases; it is a force enhancement tool that provides an outlet for the commander to ensure that the force receives clear guidance and instructions on what is expected from them. The internal information program also helps soldiers to combat the effects of enemy propaganda or misinformation.³⁸



Lesson Learned: *The weekly video teleconference as used by Task Force Eagle is an essential component to an effective Internal Information program for units deployed on contingency operations such as peace operations. The program exploited available communications systems and ensured they were used to the fullest possible extent in support of division operations. Soldiers and their families clearly benefited from effective C²-Protect operations that quelled rumors and refuted disinformation directly from the commander himself.*

PA Efforts in Building Professionalism in the Indigenous Media.


During Operations JOINT GUARD and JOINT FORGE, the Multinational Division North (MND-N) Public Affairs elements instituted efforts aimed at building professionalism among the local media, to improve truthful balanced reporting, foster contacts between the journalists and broadcasters of different ethnic groups, and improve the relationship between the peace operations force and the local communities through its relationship with its media.

The media in the former Yugoslavia represented both a challenge and an opportunity for SFOR IO. Independent media reporting, following a set of generally accepted professional practices so commonplace in the Western world, was a new and challenging concept for the media of the countries carved out of the former Communist Yugoslavia. One radio station manager in the MND-N sector stated emphatically that "independent radio (reporting) under Socialism was very hard."

Typically the challenge in reaching the desired target audience for broadcast media is the technology of the equipment in terms of the power and range of transmitter. In Bosnia, the mountainous terrain resulted in limited broadcasting range for radio and television stations, almost all of which did not have the benefit of repeaters. While broadcast range and broadcast footprint were certainly significant challenges for the local Bosnian media, they were not the only ones. The barriers to reconciliation formed during the war composed an even greater barrier than the mountainous terrain.

During the war, the media were used as IO platforms by all three sides. This was a carryover from their communist practices, where the media was largely an organ of control used by the state. After the war, the three FWFs in Bosnia often sought out media sources that they could identify with by common ethnicity. That is, Bosnian Serbs were more likely to tune in to broadcasts from Belgrade than from Sarajevo, which was closer, but perceived as Bosniac-oriented. In general, radio was the preferred means of getting news among the general population. While several daily newspapers circulated in the larger cities, the populations outside the urban core relied on radio, which was primarily local and, therefore, locally managed by those of the same ethnic group. Generally, local media were considered trusted sources of information.³⁹

During the war, and even through Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, "the media across the country remained under tight control of the dominating factions and carried the messages that fit their political masters."⁴⁰ To promote Western-style reporting of news and more balanced reporting, SFOR reached out to local journalists to build better working relationships that would ensure the media would be available to help disseminate truthful information. During peace operations, the PA public information (PI) program must focus attention on the local journalists and media, as they are usually the primary source of information for the local population. To reinforce the Civil Affairs civil-information program, and PSYOP, the PA PI program must take into account the interests and requirements of the local journalists.⁴¹




Task Force Eagle did not have a consistent, division-wide program in effect to sustain and nourish such contacts, or to help overcome the local media's handicaps of its Communist past and the suspicions of the present. However, there were several successful operations that highlighted how such a program might look. During Operation JOINT GUARD, MND-N and the Office of the High Representative-North (OHR-N) sponsored a media working group in Brcko to bring together the various ethnic media into a more cooperative and professional working relationship. The general format of this working group was to bring in Subject Matter Experts to give topical presentations. The first was given by a reserve soldier from one of the division Mobile Public Affairs Detachments, whose civilian career in broadcasting and over 10 years of experience in radio and video journalism made her uniquely qualified to brief the assembled journalists. The soldier gave a Powerpoint presentation entitled "Technical Fundamentals of Broadcasting."⁴²



MND-N Public Affairs Conference, 16 January 1999, Eagle Base. Local Media Guest Speaker, Zlatko Berbic of Radio Kameleon, 102.7 FM.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, the Nord-Pol Brigade Press Information Office in MND-N went so far as to pick up local journalists and bring them over the Zone of Separation to attend the joint press conferences hosted by SFOR and the IPTF. The Nord-Pol Brigade also hosted a "Journalist's Seminar" inviting local journalists throughout the Brigade's AOR to attend a four-day seminar in Dobo, at which journalists from several Scandinavian countries gave presentations at the invitation of their national military contingents. Experienced journalists, reporters, and editors from well-known press agencies presented lectures throughout the seminar from 12 to 16 October 1998.⁴³

During Operation JOINT FORGE, the MND-N CPIC Director, the senior Public Affairs Officer for MND-N, resuscitated programs to develop professionalism in the local media. Zlatko Berbic, the manager of a local radio station, *Radio Kameleon*, 102.7 FM, was invited to speak at the Division Public Affairs Conference held at Eagle Base on 16 January 1999. *Radio Kameleon* was considered a front-runner example of the kind of "independent media" in Bosnia that the Division wanted to promote as an independent and reinforcing institution to project the truth to the local people. Mr. Berbic and his wife Maida gave a well-received presentation to the PA personnel assembled from the Joint Public Affairs community of print, radio, and television media. These PA personnel, responsible for telling the Army story in internal information products were given a clearer picture of the challenges the media faced in the AOR.




The CPIC Director referred to such efforts aimed at building professionalism among the local media as "Media 101." At the same time that local media were learning Western journalism practices, the peace operations force was nurturing its working relationship and degree of trust with the local media. The CPIC Director suggested taking the "Media 101" concept one step further, by perhaps enlisting the aid of the U.S. Information Agency to set up more "Journalist Seminars," or "Working Groups," that would feature professional media specialists and journalists from big-name operations to give presentations to the local media. A suggested starting point was to use the existing experience already resident in the PA community, and to reach out to private enterprise through contacts at the Public Affairs Proponent Agency and the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs.

Lessons Learned: *Improving the professionalism of the local media represents a powerful strategy for increasing the channels for projection of truthful information to the local population in the peace operation AOR. A strong working relationship with the local media enhances the likelihood that they will be willing and able to carry the stories and press announcements provided in support of the Commander's Public Information Program. In addition, such interaction provides those PA elements responsible for internal information products a better understanding of the local media needs, and thus better recognize opportunities for internal information products and stories to support the public information effort.*

One of the lessons learned from the IFOR experience in this area was that PA relations with local media are "a long-term proposition, not a one-time event....[such] relationships have to be developed over time,"⁴⁴ implying an active effort on the part of PA to develop and sustain them. The techniques used by MND-N point the way to a new mission for PA in peace operations that expands the non-military INFOSYS available to the commander through which to disseminate truthful information that will shape perceptions that reinforce the objectives of the peace operations force.



The role of PA in supporting the professionalization of local media during peace operations is an extrapolation of PA doctrine concerning "proactive media facilitation." Army Public Affairs doctrine notes that "the civilian news media is an important channel to the local community."⁴⁵ Early thinking about the role of PA in IO emphasized "communicating directly with the local population to build an understanding of friendly intention,"⁴⁶ which is best accomplished through the local media that the people trust.☺



Endnotes, Chapter Five:

¹ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, **Field Manual 100-8** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 24 November 1997), p. 2-19.

² For a description of the civil-military operations associated with CA and PSYOP in MOOTW, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, **Field Manual 100-20** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 05 December 1990), p. 2-22.

³ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, **Field Manual 41-10** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 11 January 1993, hereafter cited as **Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations**), p. 3-6.

⁴ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Information Operations*, **Field Manual 100-6** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 August 1996, hereafter cited as **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**), p. 3-10. GIE is General Information Environment.

⁵ For more on the concept of the low-tech INFOSYS, see **CALLCOMS Observation 10000-27942, "UN/NGO Interface as part of the Military Information Environment and an Information System (INFOSYS)."** Although emerging Army IO doctrine de-emphasizes anything other than an equipment and systems approach to the concept of INFOSYS, current doctrine does discuss non-technical systems, automated and non-automated as well as procedural and human-centered. Future doctrine may classify the concept of the low-tech INFOSYS as merely a media through which to gain RII and to conduct offensive and defensive IO.

⁶ Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Information Operations Division, Brochure, *Information Operation*, (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 22 January 1997), pp. 7 & 8.

⁷ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Peace Operations*, **Field Manual 100-23** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 30 December 1994, hereafter cited as **Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations**), p. 18. In the same paragraph, the manual states that "the conduct of information operations...to include CA...can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation."

⁸ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 3-0.

⁹ **Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations**, p. 5-1.

¹⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, **Joint Publication 3-07** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 16 June 1995), p. IV-6.

¹¹ **Air Command and Staff College Research Project 95-053, "Planning and Executing of Conflict Termination,"** Chapter 3, Case Study Analysis (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: ACSC, 1995), p. 9. The original emphasis of this study was on combat operations and war. The term "enemy" has been substituted with "adversary" meaning those opposed to the objectives of the peace operation force, and "operation" for "war," but the statement remains accurate.


¹² Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Public Affairs Operations*, **Field Manual 46-1** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 30 May 1997, hereafter cited as **Field Manual 46-1, Public Affairs Operations**), p. 11.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁴ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 3-15.

¹⁵ Gary J. Kunich, "Serbians Make Harassment Claim," *Stars and Stripes*, vol. 57, no. 219 (22 November 1998), p. 6.

¹⁶ As translated by Dzemal Hodzic for the Office of the High Representative – North (OHR-N) from "SFOR Used Force to Identify Two Serbs," *Gras Srpски*, November 18, 1998.



¹⁷ Statement read by the Director, Coalition Press Information Center, at the OHR-N Press Conference, 27 November 1998, Brcko, Bosnia.

¹⁸ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 3-17.

¹⁹ In Task Force Eagle (MND-N), the PA duties of internal and public (external) information programs were split. The CPIC Director was responsible for the Division Commander's public information program, while the Division PAO was responsible for the Commander's Internal Information Program (formerly known as the command information program).

²⁰ Pascale Combelles Siegel, *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations* (Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1998).

²¹ **Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations**, p. 16.

²² **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, pp. 6-17 & 6-18.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. iv – v.

²⁴ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 31 May 1996), p. III-4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. IV-3.

²⁶ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Doctrine Division, **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures** (Initial Draft), (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, CADD, 30 April 1999), p. 4-1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4-7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2-4.

²⁹ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. D-3.

³⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, **Field Manual 34-1**, op. cit., p. 7-2. See also, **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 4-7.

³¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*, **Joint Pub 3-53** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 10 July 1996), p. I-4.

³² As translated and printed in the Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), 1st Cavalry Division (Forward), *Tuzla Night Owl*, vol. 4, no. 1, (01 January 1999), p. 22.

³³ **Field Manual 46-1, Public Affairs Operations**, p. 21.

³⁴ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 4-7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6-4.

³⁶ **Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 92-7, In the Spotlight, Media and the Tactical Commander**, (December 1992), p. 3.

³⁷ **Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations**, p. 6-16.

³⁸ Lt. Col. Dennis M. Murphy, USA, "Information Operations on the Nontraditional Battlefield," *Military Review*, vol. LXXVI, no. 6 (November-December 1996), p. 9.

³⁹ Larry K. Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1998), p. 58.

⁴⁰ Pascale Combelles Siegel, *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations* (Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1998), p. 22.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-174.




⁴² See CALLCOMS Observation 10009-63500, "*Media Working Group for Former Warring Faction Media Creates a New Platform for Information Operations*," in **Center for Army Lessons Learned Initial Impressions Report, B/H CAAT 9**, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, Unclassified, Distribution Limited, March 1998), p. A-61.

⁴³ The event was announced in the local press to help generate interest. See *Nezavisne Novine*, Banja Luka daily, October 5, 1998.

⁴⁴ Larry K. Wentz, "*Information Operations: The IFOR Experience*," downloaded from the National Defense University, Command and Control Research Program website at http://www.dodccrp.org/bo_infoop1.html, 19 January 1999.

⁴⁵ **Field Manual 46-1, Public Affairs Operations**, p. 39. Although this passage was written primarily with local American media in mind and from the perspective of effective installation public affairs, it accurately states the value of building strong ties to the local media in any setting.

⁴⁶ Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, ***Concept for Information Operations***, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69 (Fort Monroe, VA, 1 August 1995), p. 14.



Chapter Six

Information Systems (INFOSYS)

Current IO doctrine recognizes that military forces may often use non-military INFOSYS in conducting operations, which is especially true in MOOTW where military forces work with other agencies and in multinational coalitions. A non-military INFOSYS consist of those elements not under the control of the military force.¹ These non-military INFOSYS include the forums, working groups, and regular meetings of former warring faction (FWF) civil, police, and military leadership, meetings of political and social organizations among the local populace, and meetings of the International Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations (IOs, PVOs, and NGOs) operating in the area of operations (AO). These organizations operate in the same battlespace, but with a different focus, and with different governmental, political, social, and military interface with the FWFs. The routine meetings between the peace operation force with representatives of the IOs, NGOs, PVOs and their FWF counterpart organizations and FWF governmental, political, social and military leaders represent a "low-tech" INFOSYS which influences FWF decisionmaking.

Military IO in support of diplomacy in peace operations requires both information and useful forums in which to present that information to be successful.² Joint doctrine recognizes that INFOSYS includes forums of discussion and other media of communications that support decisionmaking.³ TFE has exploited these types of INFOSYS to answer its information requirements and to disseminate elements of the IO campaign to decisionmakers and other players whose operations intrude into the military information environment.

The concept of the low-tech INFOSYS includes both the co-opting of existing forums of FWF political, police, and military decisionmakers and the establishment of new links between the peace operations force and these FWF authorities, IOs and diplomatic elements.⁴ These routine meetings may be co-opted as necessary to provide the peace operations force with necessary information or be used as an IO platform from which to disseminate IO messages.

The concept of a low-tech INFOSYS is not yet reflected in IO doctrine (FM 100-6, August 1996). The concept of non-military INFOSYS as explained in FM 100-6 does not address the several INFOSYS operating in a peace operations environment which require almost no technical means of support and consist of meetings of decisionmakers. Examples of such INFOSYS are the forums, working groups, and regular meetings of FWF civil, police, and military leadership, meetings of political and social organizations among the local populace, and meetings of the IOs, PVOs, and NGOs operating in the AO. TFE has exploited these kinds of INFOSYS to answer its information requirements and to disseminate elements of the IO campaign to decisionmakers and other players whose operations intrude into the military information environment.

Developing a temporary low-tech INFOSYS to respond to specific IO problem sets.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, one Task Force Commander created a temporary low-tech INFOSYS to develop an integrated strategy to a difficult problem set in his AO. For events that are known in advance (elections, planned demonstrations or grave-yard visits), units have time to develop an appropriate IO strategy. These known events are examples of *Problem Sets*. A *Problem Set* is defined as "a group of related issues or events that, in the opinion of the commander, could significantly hamper or jeopardize mission success."⁵ To build such a strategy, one TF Commander created a temporary low-tech INFOSYS⁶ consisting of a forum of diplomatic and military



elements, as well as IOs operating in his AO. During Operation JOINT FORGE in December 1998, the situation in Sebnenica presented a problem set to the MND-N IO planners, for which there were no ready answers, and for which the many actors had no tactical-level means to coordinate their efforts.


The difficult situation facing SFOR in Sebnenica had its immediate roots in the 1997 municipal elections, and its deeper roots in the fate of the city during the Bosnian Civil War. Before the war, the city was inhabited almost entirely by Bosnian Muslims. Following the capture of the city by the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) in the Summer of 1995, the city was inhabited solely by Bosnian Serbs. However, the election rules established for the 1997 municipal elections allowed the Bosnian people to vote where they had claimed their home during or before the war. The assembly elected in the 1997 municipal elections consisted of 20 Bosnian Serbs and 25 Bosnian Muslims. Fifteen months after this ruling assembly had been elected, it had not yet been seated in power. The opposition in Sebnenica to allowing Bosniak participation in the ruling assembly was intense. Previous efforts by the International Community (IC) to seat the assembly had met with failure. On 19 January 1998, representatives of the IC attempted to force their way in a dramatic way into the city to establish the new government. On that attempt, demonstrating angry crowds decisively blocked the motorcade from entering the city. Again on 23 March 1998, the IC tried to seat the assembly, having gained assurances from both sides that there would not be any difficulties or provocations. The assembly was not seated when the Bosnian Muslims walked out in protest after provocations.

Subsequently, Carlos Westendorp, the appointed High Representative for the execution of the Dayton Peace Accord, created the Interim Executive Board of Sebnenica, with Mr. Larry Sampler, an American diplomat, as its Chairman, to oversee the establishment of a ruling assembly that reflected the municipal elections. Resistance from the Bosnian Serbs continued, while hardliners opposed to the DPA tightened their grip on power in the city. Faced with repeated failure and no real progress, the TF Commander responsible for the area held a series of meetings involving the leadership of the diplomatic and military instruments of power, as well as representatives from the various IOs supporting implementation of the civil aspects of the DPA.

At the invitation of the TF Commander, representatives from several organizations met at Camp Dobol to develop appropriate courses of action (COAs) to meet the challenge in Sebnenica. Two meetings were held, one to conduct an analysis of the situation (Step Two of the Five-Step Estimate of the Situation), and one to develop and war-game COAs (Steps Three and Four) to ultimately develop recommended COAs to take to the OHR for action (Decision, Step Five).

The organizations represented at these meetings included:

- **The Assistant Division Commander, Multinational Division – North (MND-N);**
- **International Chairman of the Interim Executive Board (IEB) for Sebnenica;**
- **Representatives from the U.S. Embassy, Sarajevo;**
- **The MND-N Political Advisor (POLAD);**
- **The Office of the High Representative (OHR);**
- **The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR);**
- **The Deputy Regional Commander of the International Police Task Force (IPTF);**
- **The local IPTF station commander;**
- **The LIWA Field Support Team Commander representing the IO Operations Cell of MND-N;**
- **The MND-N Joint Commission Observers (JCOs) in Sebnenica;**
- **The bde S-2 and TF S-2;**
- **The bde Civil Affairs and TF Civil Affairs Commanders, and;**
- **The Company Commander and his platoon leaders responsible for Sebnenica.**



The answers to the problems that faced SFOR in Srebrenica lay outside either the military information environment (MIE) or even the diplomatic information channels, and included the INFOSYS of a variety of uncoordinated and independent agencies and IOs. To meet his information requirements, the commander in this case had to build his own INFOSYS that would represent the many aspects of the problem set. The nature of this INFOSYS was both temporary, and low-tech, in that it consisted of a forum of representatives from the diplomatic

and military elements and the IOs operating in the AO meeting to solve a specific problem set. Current IO doctrine recognizes that military forces may often use non-military INFOSYS in conducting operations, which is especially true in MOOTW where military forces work with other agencies and in multinational coalitions. A non-military INFOSYS consist of those elements not under the control of the military force.⁷




Creating a temporary Low-Tech INFOSYS -- the Task Force Commander assembles subject matter experts from the IOs in the Task Force AOR to map out the strategy.

Lesson Learned: *The TF Commander's creation of a temporary low-tech INFOSYS to analyze the situation, develop and war-game COAs, and produce that COA which unified the efforts of the supporting organizations, provides an example of how the commander in a peace operation can reach outside his military INFOSYS to meet the needs of his information requirements.*

Maintaining a Low-Tech INFOSYS requires mediation and salesmanship skills.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, one Task Force Commander noted that maintaining an effective low-tech INFOSYS with the local civilian and police authorities and Entity Armed Forces (EAF) military leaders, required both mediation and salesmanship skills. During the unit's Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE), the emphasis was on "hostile situations" where forceful insistence was the required response. For the most part, the routine meetings between the peace operations force commander and local authorities were more businesslike and less adversarial. As one Battalion Task Force Commander put it: "It is not always a debate – it is often informal, friendly conversation." It is this informal friendly conversation that builds up trust between the local civil and military authorities and the peace operations force. Over time, a friendly relationship based on respectful conduct confers a degree of reliability in the low-tech INFOSYS. To be useful in resolving crises, the low-tech INFOSYS must be



reliable – that is, it must be readily available when needed. When crises do erupt, the commander needs to be able to rely on his contacts (the low-tech INFOSYS) to be there to both provide information on the situation and to hear the commander provide the official position of the peace operations force.


Mediation and salesmanship skills must be part of any leader-training program for units deploying to peace operations. As the civil aspects take on increasing importance in mature peace operations, military leaders deploying to such operations must be ready to communicate effectively and persuasively with the leadership of local civil, social, police, and military groups and organizations.⁸ Along with mediation skills to resolve problems, the techniques of the salesman in developing and sustaining contacts must also be trained. One Task Force Commander stated that the reliability of the low-tech INFOSYS is built up over time, mostly through "small talk." For example, the TF Commander discovered through friendly conversation that one of the local police chiefs in his AO was a youth soccer coach. Knowing this, the TF Commander highlighted in conversation how the Civil Affairs element had recently delivered donated sports equipment to the local youth group.

In a different town, another police chief provided information on a demonstration that resulted in the fiery destruction of a vehicle belonging to the ECMM (European Community Monitors Mission). Details available on the actions of the local police and the circumstances of the demonstration and beating of the ECCM representative and destruction of his vehicle were sketchy at best. Because the TF Commander had gained the respect and trust of the police chief over time, sustaining the relationship in the absence of crisis, he was able to gain information that completed the intelligence picture on the demonstration. The TF Commander noted that it is most important to keep such contacts maintained when an area is a "sleepy hollow" as events can turn to crisis overnight.

During such routine meetings, the TF Commander would commend positive actions and developments in the implementation of the peace accord, cajole the contacts on areas where progress was slow, and reinforce the official position on those areas where progress was lacking. The TF Commander noted that he "always" discovered important information through the low-tech INFOSYS that he would not get through the military INFOSYS of intelligence channels. Usually, these meetings provided new and precise intelligence on the situation to higher headquarters.

TTPs for developing and sustaining contacts include building a "contact data base" that compiles the facts and insights obtained over time through regular contacts. Such a data base is extremely important in mature peace operations where units may rotate in and out, allowing the incoming commander to pick up the low-tech INFOSYS where the departing commander left off. Before scheduled meetings, commanders should review the file to "brush up" on conversation topics. Commanders must act on the concerns of the local officials and be ready to provide "follow-up" information regarding the topics raised in the last meeting. Verifying the correct pronunciation of their first and last names every time with the interpreter prevents a *faux pas* – foreign languages may present challenges here in correct pronunciation.

Lesson Learned: *Low-tech INFOSYS involving meetings with local leaders may be viewed as a relationship, not unlike the relationship between a salesman and his client in terms of the background work necessary to keep the relationship sustained and viable. Conversational and mediation skills are required for effective use of this low-tech INFOSYS. If the low-tech INFOSYS is to be used in times of crisis, it must be maintained through consistent effort at communication, even in the absence of problems. Leaders deploying to peace operations must receive training in mediation and conversational "salesmanship" skills to effectively utilize the low-tech INFOSYS comprised of the routine meetings with local civil and police authorities, social and civic leaders, and units of the armed forces of the FWFs.*




Maintaining the Reliability of the Low-Tech INFOSYS

Low-tech INFOSYS, consisting of forums of military and civilian decisionmakers, are subject to corruption by uncontrolled access and conflicting messages. During Operation JOINT FORGE, one Base Camp and Task Force Commander in TFE established a low-tech INFOSYS with the political leadership of the towns in his AOR. On several occasions, this INFOSYS provided positive results and allowed the commander to directly communicate to the right decisionmakers. However, the dependability of such INFOSYS requires a certain degree of control over access from the peace operations force. Too many actors utilizing the same INFOSYS can easily result in a diluted or confused message from the peace operations force to the target audience.

In the case of the town of Sebnica, there existed the officially recognized government of the city, sanctioned by the International Community, and a shadow government of hardliners, with whom SFOR had ended all contact. The TF Commander responsible for this area was unpleasantly surprised when representatives from an SFOR military band arranged a concert in the town on their own, without coordination with the TF. The uncoordinated actions of the SFOR military band set back efforts at excluding hardliners from the political process and undermined the TF Commander's position, as well as that of the officially recognized civilian leadership cooperating with SFOR.

The commander termed this phenomenon "double-tapping."⁹ At the Division level, protocols have been established, as well as Attack Guidance Matrices which specify who is authorized to communicate information to various civilian and police authorities and units of the EAF. Such control is necessary to prevent "double-tapping" and confusion.

Lesson Learned: *Once the peace operations force has created a low-tech INFOSYS consisting of regular forums of decisionmakers, commanders must ensure that uncontrolled access to such forums do not corrupt the clarity of communications between the peace operations force and the intended audience. To maintain assured, clear, and consistent communications to the target audience, low-tech INFOSYS established by peace operations forces at all levels must have access controlled by the commander to prevent corruption or negation of the desired official messages. ☺*



Endnotes, Chapter Six:

¹ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Information Operations*, FM 100-6 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 August 1996), p. 5-5.

² Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *The Nation and Military Power*, Student Text S511, Lesson 1 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: CGSC Press, 27 March 1995, p. LSN 1-2-3.

³ **Joint Publication 3-13.1, *Command and Control Warfare*** (Washington, DC: USGPO, 7 February 1996), p. v.

⁴ For more on the concept of the low-tech INFOSYS, see CALLCOMS observation No. 10000-27942, "*UN/NGO Interface as part of the Military Information Environment and an Information System (INFOSYS)*."


⁵ Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), *Introduction to Information Campaign Planning and Execution* (Student Materials prepared for the LIWA by SYTEX Inc., Vienna, VA, May 1998).

⁶ See CALLCOMS observation No. 10000-27942, "*UN/NGO Interface as part of the Military Information Environment and an Information System (INFOSYS)*." See also, **Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 99-2**, Jan 99, *Task Force Eagle Information Operations: IO in a Peace Enforcement Environment*, Chapter Five, "INFOSYS." The concept of a low-tech INFOSYS is one where the emphasis is on a forum of decisionmakers, rather than on communications infrastructure and equipment.

⁷ Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Information Operations*, **Field Manual 100-6**, p. 5-5.

⁸ See Kenneth H. Pritchard, LTC, USAR, "**The Army and Civil-Military Operations in the 21st Century**," *Army* (December 1997), vol. 47, no. 12, pp. 6-9. LTC Pritchard argues for more leader training in mediation skills in connection with MOOTW.

9. A reference to the practice of the violent use of force, shooting everyone encountered during an assault onto an objective without determining whether or not they have already been killed.



Appendix A

Abbreviations

- A -


AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange System
AAR	after-action review
ACE	analysis control element
AFSCoord	Assistant Fire Support Coordinator
A/N	Army/Navy
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
ASAS	All-Source Analysis System

- B -

BDA	battle damage assessment
Bde	brigade
BiH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bn	battalion

- C -

C ²	command and control
C ² W	command and control warfare
C ³	command, control, and communications
C ⁴	command, control, communications, and computers
C ⁴ ISR	C ⁴ and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CA	civil affairs
CAAT	Combined Arms Assessment Team
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CALLCOMS	Center for Army Lessons Learned Collection Observation Management System
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CINC	Commander in Chief
CIRP	Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program
CJCTF	Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force
CNA	computer network attack
COA	course of action
COMEAGLE	Commander, Task Force Eagle



COMPUSEC	computer security
COMSEC	communications security
COMSFOR	Commander, SFOR
CONPLAN	contingency plan
CPIC	Coalition Press Information Center

- D -

DFSCCOORD	Deputy Fire Support Coordinator
DPA	Dayton Peace Accord
DPDD	Division PSYOP Development Detachment
DPRE	displaced persons and refugees
DPSE	Division PSYOP Support Element
DST	direct support team
DTLOMS	Doctrine, Training, Leader development, Organizational, Materiel, and Soldier issues

- E -


EAF	Entity Armed Forces
ECMM	European Community Monitors Mission
EW	electronic warfare

- F -

FRAGO	fragmentary order
FRG	Family Readiness Group
FSE	Fires Support Element
FSG	Family Support Group
FST	Field Support Team
FWF	former warring faction

- G -

GFAP	General Framework on the Agreement for Peace
GIE	Global Information Environment



- H -

HN	host nation
HUMINT	human intelligence

- I -


IAW	in accordance with
IC	international community
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal (for war crimes) in the former Yugoslavia
IEB	Interim Executive Board
IEW	intelligence and electronic warfare
IFOR	Implementation Force
IIR	initial impressions report
IMINT	imagery intelligence
INFOSEC	information security
INFOSYS	information systems
IO	information operations
IOs	international organizations
IOWG	Information Operations Working Group
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPTF	International Police Task Force
ITP	Instructions to the Parties
IW	information warfare

- J -

JCO	Joint Commission Observer
JMC	Joint Military Commission
JVB	Joint Visitors Bureau

- L -

LIWA	Land Information Warfare Activity
LNO	liaison officer



- M -

MDMP	military decisionmaking process
METL	mission essential task list
MIE	military information environment
MND-N	Multinational Division-North
MND-SW	Multinational Division-Southwest
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MPAD	Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
MRE	mission rehearsal exercise

- N -


NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
NGO	non-governmental organization
Nord-Pol	Nordic-Polish

- O -

OHR	Office of the High Representative
OJE	Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR
OJF	Operation JOINT FORGE
OJG	Operation JOINT GUARD
OOTW	operations other than war
OPSEC	operations security
OPTEMPO	operations tempo
OSINT	open-source intelligence

- P -

PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PIO	Press Information Officer
PMO	Provost Marshal
POLAD	political advisor
POTF	Psychological Operations Task Force
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private volunteer organization
PX	post exchange



- Q -

QRF Quick Reaction Force

- R -

RII relevant information and intelligence
RS *Republika Srpska* (Bosnian Serb Republic)
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

- S -


SA situational awareness
SFOR Stabilization Force
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SME subject matter expert
SOCCE Special Operations Coordination and Control Element
SOP standing operating procedure
SSO Special Security Officer

- T -

TACLAN Tactical Local Area Network
TFE Task Force Eagle
TOR terms of reference
TPT Tactical PSYOP Team
TST Tactical Support Team
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

- U -

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
USAID United States Agency for Internal Development
USIA United States Information Agency
USIS United States Information Service
UXO unexploded ordnance



- V -

VAT	Vulnerability Assessment Team
VIP	very important person
VRS	Bosnian Serb Army

- W -

WHOP	Weapons Hand-Over Program
WMG	weekly media guidance
WSS	weapons storage site

- Z -

ZOS	zone of separation
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